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1. Introduction
For the financial development of the East Asian region the Asian financial crisis in 1997
has been a decisive turning point. The crisis sparked discussions about crony capitalism,
governance, over-reliance on the banking system and the impact of short-term capital
inflows. It also highlighted the positive impacts of local bond markets on financial
stability and overall economic development. Bond markets perform a number of very
diverse roles in the financial system. Governments and cooperations use them as a form
of finance, monetary authorities rely on bonds to perform open market operations and
control the liquidity of the financial system, and investors can gain valuable information
on market expectations through the bond markets.
Except for Japan, the region’s bond markets were virtually non-existent prior to 1997.
Instead, the region was solely relying on bank debt and equity for finance. The crisis ex-
posed the missing channel of a developed bond market and revealed that this dependence
led to vulnerabilities in the region’s financial system. The debate among the regional
elite that followed the crisis kick-started the rapid development in the East Asian debt
markets that followed.
Financially and economically, East Asia is still a very heterogeneous region. From
a bond market’s point of view two things constitute the East Asian region: (1) the
common Asian financial crisis in 1997 and (2) the financial cooperation emerging from
this crisis. While this cooperation persists and development converges, the region still
remains diverse with many different institutions, levels of development and distinctive
financial histories. A first glance at the region’s debt markets shows that all countries
went through a rapid phase of development during the last decade. Markets developed
both quantitatively and qualitatively. Despite the fast pace of bond market development
differences remain in many aspects.
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1.1. Research Question
This thesis dissects the current state of development and integration in the East Asian
debt markets and identifies major determinants that led to the rapid development and
explain remaining differences in the level of development. The questions answered are:
• What are the potentials of developing and integrating domestic bond markets?
• What is the state of development and integration in the East Asian bond markets
(government and corporate)?
• What are the determinants of bond market growth in East Asia? How can the
uneven speed and progress in the regional development of the East Asian bond
markets be explained?
1.2. Outline
The following chapter (2) gives an overview of the theory of bond market development,
concepts used, as well as the methods applied in this thesis. The region’s state of
the market will be assessed both quantitatively and qualitatively. In quantity, the size
and liquidity of the debt market will be used to compare the markets. In terms of
quality, it is evaluated what role bond markets are performing in an economy and which
potential benefits arise out of the market development. Given the experience of the
Asian financial crisis, a special focus on the aspects of financial stability is employed.
Finally, the chapter gives an overview of the most important empirical determinants of
bond market development in East Asia.
Chapter 3 uses the established concepts of size and liquidity to examine the current
state of the East Asian government- and corporate bond market. The respective markets
are analyzed regarding to what extent they are integrated and play a beneficial role in
the economy, based on the theory of bond market development reviewed in chapter 2.
Throughout this chapter three major observations are formulated as hypotheses of bond
market determinants, that will be tested statistically in the next chapter.
Chapter 4 uses an empirical cross-sectional model to evaluate the most important
determinants of bond market growth in East Asia. The model is based on the work of
Bhattacharyay (2011) and Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2006) and will be used
6
to test the three hypotheses stated in chapter 3 in addition to the factors already found
in academic literature.
Chapter 5 summarizes the major findings, briefly answers the stated research questions
and draws conclusions from the findings.
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2. Theory and Method
This chapter will introduce the most important concepts used in this thesis. Size and
liquidity are quantitative indicators and will be described after a quick introduction into
bonds and the difference between government- and corporate bonds. The following sec-
tion will give an overview of the qualitative roles the bond markets are playing in an
economy and how they can benefit economic growth. The subsequent sections exam-
ine the academic literature on which endogenous factors of an economy determine the
development of corporate- and government bond markets and the methodology used to
test a subset of these determinants empirically for the East Asian bond markets.
The selection of countries dealt with in this thesis is based on the markets targeted
by the two regional initiatives to foster bond market development: the Asian Bond
Funds and the Asian Bond Market Initiative1. The Asian Bond Market Initiative tar-
gets the ASEAN+3 bond markets, whereas the Asian Bond Funds target the bond
markets of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore
and Thailand. By this the bond markets of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Ko-
rea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam will be dealt with,
although the discussion is limited by data availability in some cases.
2.1. Bond Markets
Essentially, bonds are a form of loan that is trade-able. Brown describes bonds as:
In general terms, a bond is a loan by one party (the investor or holder) to
another party (the issuer). The issuer gives the investor a guarantee that he
or she will pay interest on the loan at regular intervals and repay the loan
at a specified time in the future. In addition, the issuer may retain or grant
embedded options that he or she or the investor can exercise in the future.
Brown (2006, 1)
1For more on these initiatives see chapter 3.3.3.
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The interest payed on a bond is called coupon, while the loan that is going to be paid
back at the end of a certain period (at maturity) is called principal or redemption value.
There are numerous types of bonds that have different and distinctive features, some
are very simple, some are complex . For example, rates to calculate the coupon may be
fixed or linked to an external measure (like the LIBOR). A zero-coupon bond pays no
coupons at all and instead has a price lower than the principal. The maturity of a bond
may vary vastly as well. Some bonds are issued for periods of 30-years, some may only
last under a year. Some bonds may also include an option for the issuer or holder of
a bond, such as the option to convert the bonds into another instruments like shares.
Bonds also have different kinds of guarantees. Some bonds are completely guaranteed
by another company, some are backed by assets (“asset-backed-securities”), while others
may not be backed by anything else than the company that issued them (Brown 2006).
A major feature of bonds is that they are tradable. When issued, bonds are traded
in the primary market. The market for bonds that have already been issued is called
secondary market. In contrast to stocks, bonds are mostly traded “over-the-counter”
(OTC) in a network of dealers and market makers (primarily banks), instead of a cen-
tralized exchange. For the East Asian region the Korea Exchange (KRX) is an example
of a centralized exchange. It provides a platform for trading Korean treasury-bonds.
Government issued bonds usually have a higher potential of being trade in an exchange,
as they usually have high liquidity and are widely used in the financial system, since
they are often regarded as very safe investments.
Because government bonds play a different, more special role than corporate issued
bonds in the economy, both markets will mostly be dealt with separately throughout
this thesis. The distinction between government and corporate bonds is based upon the
primary data source, AsianBondsOnline, that defines both markets as:
Government bonds include obligations of the central government, local gov-
ernments, the central bank, and state-owned entities. Corporates comprise
both public and private companies including financial institutions and inter-
national organizations. Financial institutions comprise both private and pub-
lic sector banks and other financial institutions. AsianBondsOnline (2012b)
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2.1.1. Size and Liquidity
The two major quantitative variables used to analyze the bond markets in the region
are liquidity and size of the respective markets.
2.1.1.1. Size
To measure the absolute size of bond markets the total nominal amount of bonds out-
standing will be used. It can be misleading to solely focus on the absolute growth of
bond market capitalization as the size of the overall economy differ substantially among
countries in the East Asian region. In most cases the ratio of the total nominal amount
outstanding to GDP is used instead of absolute volumes of bonds outstanding.
Still, the absolute size of bond markets may not be completely irrelevant. Eichengreen
and Luengnaruemitchai (2006, 44) advance the thesis that “[s]mall countries presumably
find it more difficult to develop bond markets insofar as liquid securities markets have a
certain minimum efficient scale”. By this, large economies may consequently have more
efficient markets at a lower size to GDP ratio, as smaller economies, because they reach
the effective scale more easily. This proposition will be tested empirically in chapter 4.
2.1.1.2. Liquidity
A market’s liquidity is an important indicator of its efficiency. In general asset liquidity
is an elusive concept and different aspects are mentioned and highlighted in academic
literature. Baker (1996)2 identifies three major properties of asset liquidity in a market:
(1) market depth, indicating that there are orders above and below the actually traded
price of an asset; (2) market breadth, that requires large amounts of both buying and
selling orders; and (3) market resilience, indicating that price changes are followed by
numerous orders quickly after the change. Additionally Sarr and Lybek (2002, 5) see
two more properties of liquid markets: (4) tightness, indicating small transaction costs,
such as a small spread between buy and sell prices; and (5) immediacy, representing the
speed with which trades are able to be settled.
The essence of a liquid market is the possibility of investors to sell their assets imme-
diately without adversely effecting the price of the asset. Liquidity is thus an essential
attribute of a functioning efficient market. Insufficient liquidity increases the transaction
costs within the market as investors have to charge a liquidity-premium for illiquid assets
2Cited in (Alexandros et al. 2011, 4).
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and are thus increasing the yield for borrowers. Infrequently traded securities also lack
content of information that is necessary to make optimal decisions, for both investors
and borrowers. An increase in liquidity and a concurrent decrease of the transaction
costs can thus provide more efficient information and increase the economic viability of
productive projects and thereby spur economic growth (Spratt 2009, 52).
As liquidity has many facets, there are several ways of measuring financial market
liquidity. Sarr and Lybek (2002) see four different types of measurements: (1) transac-
tion costs based indicators; (2) volume-based indicators; (3) price-based indicators that
resorts to the frequency of new, price-based information influencing the market; and (4)
market-impact indicators that try to extract movements due to new information. Each
of these indicators is focusing on specific aspects of market liquidity, they all show a
certain part of the picture, but not all of it. Despite the numerous ways of measuring
liquidity, the availability of data is often a constraining factor, especially in developing
markets.
This thesis will only resort to two of the most basic measurements of liquidity, a
volume-based and a transaction cost indicator. Transaction costs are most easily mea-
sured using the spread between the seller’s ask and the buyer’s bid-price (the bid-ask-
spread). The higher the spread the higher the transaction costs and the more illiquid
is a financial market. The benefit of this indicator is that it encompasses all costs that
investors face in a trade, the costs of illiquidity, of settlement, taxes and other implicit
costs. It is also very easy to observe and data is usually widely available. The downside
is that many different factors influence the transaction costs and the indicator conse-
quently can only give a very general picture of liquidity in the market (Sarr and Lybek
2002, 9-10).
The second indicator used, the turnover-ratio, is volume-based. It is calculated by
dividing the trade-volume (V ) within a given period by the total value of securities
outstanding (the product of average traded price (P ) and the stock outstanding (S)):
Tn = V/P ∗S. This indicator is useful in measuring the breadth of the market (numerous
and large amounts of orders). A broad market gives investors more resilient and reliable
information as it takes large amounts to move the market and markets are thereby not
as easily distorted by individual orders. In markets where price, volume and total stock
data are easy to obtain (it is for example hard to obtain the stock of the money-market)
this is an easily usable measurement of liquidity. The downside of this indicator is that
it does not take into account whether large orders influence the asset price (Sarr and
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Lybek 2002, 11-13).
The size of a market is also affecting liquidity. For example a larger outstanding
stock of government bonds decreases the transaction costs within the market through
the money- and futures market. But the sheer size of the market is not the only factor
determining liquidity. Structural and institutional factors, such as taxes, clearing- and
settlement practices and the outstanding amount of benchmark securities as well as the
investor base, the type of investors and whether investors are diverse or trade actively
also play a role (McCauley and Remolona 2000, 54).
The major part of the local bond market investor base usually consists of either local
banks, mutual funds, pension funds or non-resident investors. In many emerging mar-
kets, local banks are the most important participant in the bond markets. In 2005, 42
% of total emerging bonds were held by local banks. Pension funds are predominantly
long-term oriented risk-averse funds that are able to provide substantial liquidity, es-
pecially in the primary market. Pension funds are largely underdeveloped in emerging
markets and are building up their portfolios, thus providing only little liquidity in the
secondary market. Mutual funds are similarly underdeveloped in emerging markets but
can provide liquidity in the secondary market as they actively trade a large part of their
securities. Non-resident investors may also bring liquidity to both the primary and the
secondary market, as they tend to have a more diverse portfolio and thus may keep
securities even during shocks. Foreign investors are specially attracted by the possibility
to hedge against risks by the use of financial derivatives. But foreign participation is
sometimes also associated with higher volatility and sudden capital flow reversals. As
different investor classes have different preferences, a diverse investor base provides con-
tinuous liquidity and may also play an important factor in the transmission of financial
shocks in a market. When investors are not very diverse in their preferences and their
portfolios not diversified or increasingly leveraged, markets may become less resilient
and quickly illiquid during rapid down movements (Turner 2008).
2.2. The Potentials of Bond Market Development
As bond markets are a market-based form of finance, they are regarded to be in certain
aspects superior to non-market-based forms of finance. They also diversify the financial
system of a country and by this may promote stability and resilience to external shocks.
After shortly introducing concepts of financial instability, the following section sheds
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light on the potential benefits on economic growth that result from the development of
a bond market, as well as the risks of financial instability. The first subsection will deal
with the government bond market, the second with the corporate bond market and the
third section will review the potentials of financial integration in the bond markets.
Financial Instability
While the consensus of academic literature sees financial development as beneficial for
eonomic growth, there is also a large number of literature that suggests that financial
development is a two-edged sword that can come with severe costs aside its positive
effects on economic growth (Fink et al. 2003). The development of, and dependence on
financial markets gives rise to new forms of economic instability, that are absent in a
strictly regulated economy. This financial instability may induce financial crises that
can cause severe economic downturns and considerably dampen economic growth. The
Asian financial crisis (AFC) is the best example at hand: substantial gains preceded
the crisis, but the crisis itself also induced immense costs. Chen and Ravallion (2001)
calculated that the AFC increased the number of poor in the region by 22 million. In
the context of East Asia it cannot be stressed enough that since the AFC there has been
a decisive focus on financial stability in academia and among the elites in East Asia
in order to prevent another severe financial crisis. As will be shown, the very effort to
establish bond markets in the region stems from the experiences of the financial crisis
and the believe that bond markets can increase financial stability and possibly prevent
future crises in the region.
Financial instability can originate from several different sources. Eichengreen (2004)
identifies four different causes that can lead to financial crises:
• Unsustainable Macroeconomic Policies, often caused by weaknesses in the policy
making process, can have destabilizing effects on the financial system. Examples
are public debt financed by central banks or expansionary fiscal policy that makes
a currency peg unsustainable.
• Fragile Financial Systems can be rooted in the balance sheets of the domestic
actors. Examples of such balance sheet vulnerabilities are a mismatch in currency
or maturity.
• Institutional Weakness is caused by a lack of accountability and prudential regu-
lation that can lead to problems of moral hazard and adverse selection in financial
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markets.
• Flaws in the Structure of International Financial Markets lie outside of the domes-
tic markets and can not be influenced directly by the respective actors. Examples
are high mobility of capital that can lead to sudden reversals of capital flows or
speculators that can exaggerate small vulnerabilities.
When assessing and analyzing the potential benefits of bond market development the
possible effects on financial stability will be taken into account.
2.2.1. Government Bond Market
In contrast to firms that have to take both the state of the market and market-regulation
as given, governments have multiple roles in the bond market. On the one hand they
are regulating the bond markets by providing a regulatory framework and the legislative
enforcement of it. They also may play an indirect role in the general financial system
and the bond market in particular, through the central bank and public- and other gov-
ernment related institutions. But on the other hand the government is also an active
participant in the financial system by borrowing from the financial system and partic-
ularly through the government bond market (Spratt 2009, 3). At first this section will
take a look why the government bond market, as a market-based form of government
finance, has the least disruptive effects on the economy. Then it will deal with potential
spill-over effects on the economy, most notably the effects of a yield curve. And thirdly
the problem of “original sin” and excessive government debt as a source of financial
instability.
2.2.1.1. Versatility of the Government Bond Debt
The government debt market is not the only way for a government to acquire funds. In
the path of financial development, market-based borrowing, from an established govern-
ment bond market at market-determined rates, is the last stage of development. Fry
(1997) identifies four different ways for a government to finance its debt:
• by directly borrowing from the central bank and thus monetizing its debt. This
kind of lending is associated with inducing inflation.
• by borrowing below market rates through forcing national actors to hold more
government securities than they would voluntarily hold and thus reducing inter-
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est rates and distorting markets; this kind of government involvement is labeled
financial repression and -restriction.
• by borrowing in a foreign currency; this usually creates additional costs by exposing
the government to exchange rate risks. Governments are usually only able to
borrow in the medium and short term through this option. This can create a
vicious circle in which most emerging economies are not able to borrow in their
own currency abroad. This phenomenon is called “original sin” and will be dealt
with more closely in section 2.2.1.3.2. Furthermore, borrowing in a foreign currency
is associated with inducing upward pressure on the domestic currency which can
have negative effects on inflation or exports.
• The last possibility to finance government debt is by borrowing directly through
capital markets at undistorted market interest rates. This kind of finance creates
no market distortions and is thus regarded as the most efficient form of borrowing
in the long term.
Except for the option of solely market based finance, the other options are, at least
in some way, disturbing market allocation and are associated with negative effects on
growth and total welfare. Excessive monetization of government debt increases reserve
money and is likely to cause inflation. As is well explored in economic literature infla-
tion imposes various costs on the economy and reduces economic growth. Because the
negative effects on economic growth are not immediately visible the implementation of
such growth dampening and inflation-inducing policies can nevertheless be tempting for
governments and policy-makers. For example, the finance of a certain policy by forcing
domestic actors to lend cheaply to the government is ultimately crowding-out private
investments and hiding the real costs of a government investment (Fry 1997, 6).
In contrast to the first three methods of finance described above, a completely volun-
tary auction of government debt would allow a more efficient allocation of capital and
would have the least disturbing effects on economic growth. A survey among central
banks by Fry (1997) came to the conclusion that voluntary government debt markets
are perceived to reduce inflation induced by government lending, impose stronger fiscal
discipline on governments by reflecting the true market costs of debt finance and increase
liquidity of government debt securities. Liquid government securities may consequently
increase the efficiency of capital allocations by providing a benchmark yield curve, foster
the creation of new financial instruments and increase the overall attractiveness of the
15
country as an investment center (Fry 1997, 117).
As a side node, it has to be mentioned that some sort of coordination between the
central bank and the government is necessary, so that the issuance of government securi-
ties does not conflict monetary policy targets by the central bank. Governments should
thus make public in advance how many securities will be issued, so that the central bank
can absorb fluctuations in the money supply (World Bank 2001, 4 and 10).
This leads us to the usage of the bond market for monetary policy. Central banks can
conduct monetary policy more easily when the government bond market is both deep
and liquid. As it can use open market operations to fine-tune the short-term liquidity as
well as to withdraw liquidity in the medium- and long-term from the financial system.
Without a developed and liquid bond market, central banks have to rely on non-market
based instruments. The most common non-market instrument are reserve requirements:
By increasing the reserve requirements banks have to put a higher reserve for their assets
on their deposits at the central bank. This drains liquidity from the financial sector.3
Since it is costly for the banking sector to adjust their balance sheet when coping with
such an increase or decrease in reserve requirements, this instrument is rarely used alone.
Instead, central banks increasingly try to use market-based instruments such as open
market operations, in order to sterilize unneeded liquidity in the market without forcing
financial institutions to adapt their balance sheets (Nyawata 2012). Such open market
operations include:
• The selling of securities: A central bank sells some of the securities it owns in
order to decrease the cash in circulation. These securities usually are government
securities. The central bank has to own these securities in the first place in order
to be able to sell them. This imposes certain limits on this option, when it is not
coordinated with the government. With close cooperation the government could
issue government securities and deposit the proceedings at the central bank. This
would have the same effect on liquidity, but would not fragment the market.
• The issuance of central bank bills is a more direct option: In this case central
banks issue bonds on their own, receiving cash in circulation but in turn have
to pay the coupon on the bonds. These bonds usually have short maturity, but
this also depends on the central bank’s strategy and the willingness of the private
sector to buy these securities.
3For a more detailed and theoretical explanation of Sterilization see Age´nor and Montiel (2008, 226-
227).
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• For very short maturities central banks use repurchase agreements (repos) or var-
ious lending facilities to fine-tune the money supply. As technically these are not
bonds but instruments, they are not relevant for this discussion of government
bond markets in East Asia.
The central bank may use any combination of these policies to withdraw or inject
liquidity from or into the financial system. The advantage of the issuance of central
bank bills is that the central bank can act independently and no coordination with the
government is necessary. There is also no need of an already established market for
treasury bonds (T-bills). The downside is that central bank bills are only similar to, but
not equivalent to T-bills. This could possibly lead to a fragmentation of the domestic
bond market. When the central bank coordinates the monetary intervention with the
government and uses government- instead of central bank securities it can help “to lump”
and create a market (McCauley and Remolona 2000, 55).
When issuing government debt and when tuning liquidity, the market based auctions
of government bonds have the least disturbing and crowding-out effects on private actors.
A market based allocation of capital is also more efficient and causing less miss allocations
than other forms of government finance. Although Spratt (2009, 108) notes that there is
little direct evidence linking the development of government bond markets to economic
growth, such a market is still seen to be a vital part of financial markets and able to
increase the resilience of the domestic financial system. The establishment of a vital
government bond market can thus be considered to be the best option when considering
government finance and is also providing various spill-over effects into other parts of the
economy.
2.2.1.2. Yield Curve and the spill-over effects of the government bond market
The most acknowledged spill-over effect of government bond markets are the effects of a
yield curve onto the economy. The yield curve “represents the relationship between mar-
ket remuneration (interest) rates and the remaining time to maturity of debt securities.
The information content of a yield curve reflects the asset pricing process on financial
markets” (ECB 2012). A yield curve consists of yields (interest) on a certain security at
different points in time. Government securities are considered to be usually the most liq-
uid and sometimes the safest securities in a financial market. A government-benchmark
yield curve thus gives investors and other actors in financial markets valuable insights
on expectations of interests and economic activity at different points in time. The US
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yield curve has for example predicted nearly every recession after World War II with
the only exception of a slowdown in the late 1960s. But the reliability of the yield curve
as a predictor has recently been challenged and evidence for emerging economies has
remained scarce, especially because most emerging economies only recently developed
liquid domestic securities markets (Mehl 2006).
In order to develop a benchmark yield curve it is essential for the government to
issue benchmark securities in accordance with certain benchmark maturities. When the
government concentrates on these maturities they will be more liquid, which will in
turn decrease the costs of finance and enables the market to use them as convenient
benchmarks. When the government spreads the benchmarks across a wide range of
maturities it provides the necessary information to investors to build a yield curve (World
Bank 2001, 13).
The fact that government bond yields can be used to be the base for other securities,
instruments and derivatives can also provide other spill-over effects to the economy.
Inflation-indexed debt securities may for example provide a market-based estimation of
expected inflation.
2.2.1.3. Financial Stability
Regarding the government bond market there are two potential sources of financial
instability. The first one is the excessive use of government debt and the second derives
from a flaw in the structure of international financial markets, that prevent emerging
markets to borrow abroad in their own currency.
2.2.1.3.1. Unsustainable Macroeconomic Policies – Excessive Government Debt
While the development of a government debt market has several positive externalities
to the economy, public debt can also have a destabilizing effect on the economy. This
is especially the case when debt levels become excessive. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)
find that high levels of public debt (above 90 % of GDP) are associated with weak
GDP growth rates, while the same link is relatively weak below this threshhold. As this
finding is consistent among developing and developed countries, it shows that excessive
government debt has a negative impact on growth. Although public debt levels in Asia
are relatively high and have particularly risen in the last decade, this has to be mainly
attributed to the simulatenous accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and not to the
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actual accumulation of public debt as will be described later4.
2.2.1.3.2. Flaws in the Structure of International Financial Markets – Original
Sin East Asia’s local currency bond markets developed rapidly in the last decade.
This has mainly been attributed to the growth of local currency markets. This kind of
domestic borrowing has several positive effects on the economy by intermediating more
efficiently between domestic actors. But it could also be necessary to transfer resources
between foreign and domestic actors, for example to finance large projects, to smooth
consumption and especially to finance a public deficit in times of a crisis (more on this
in chapter 2.2.3.1).
Historical experience suggests that developing countries found it difficult to borrow
abroad in their own domestic currency, irrespectively of their previous policies or behav-
ior. This phenomenon is termed “original sin”. Original sin is defined as
“a situation in which the domestic currency cannot be used to borrow abroad
or to borrow long term, even domestically. In the presence of this incom-
pleteness, financial fragility is unavoidable because all domestic investments
will have either a currency mismatch (projects that generate pesos will be
financed with dollars) or a maturity mismatch (long-term projects will be
financed with short-term loans)”. (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999, 3)
There are several, mostly multi-factor explanations why original sin exists and why the
international bond markets are dominated by only five currencies. For this analysis it
is only important that original sin can cause severe exposure to developing countries
balance sheets.
The theory of original sin was increasingly challenged in the 2000s. Emerging market
debt was becoming attractive to foreign investors due to a high return compared to a
relatively low variance during this time. At the same time this period also marked a
decade of very high international liquidity and a high appetite for risk. And the investor
base of emerging market economies increasingly included non-leveraged investors such as
dedicated emerging market bond funds. These developments led academia to challenge
whether original sin is still prevalent (Turner 2012, 20, 25).
4Even though East Asian countries have been using fiscal policies to dampen the impact of the global
financial crisis from 2008-2009.
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2.2.2. Corporate Bond Market
The potential benefits of the corporate bond market on economic growth lies in it’s role
of financial intermediation. The debate whether financial intermediation in general is
beneficial for growth is still ambiguous and not entirely resolved. It started as early as
in 1911 with Schumpeter (1993), by now about five major strands have emerged. The
major consensus is the supply leading hypothesis which maintains that growth in the
financial sector positively effects economic growth. The demand leading hypothesis sees
the reverse causality that economic growth is endogenously driving the growth in the
finance sector. Lucas (1988) view that in a neo-classical world with zero-transaction
costs and perfect information the financial sector should be neutral and have no direct
effect on economic growth is another minor strand, that has been vigorously attacked
from many different sides. The last branch of theory about financial intermediation
sees a negative causal relationship between financial sector development and growth
(Fink et al. 2003, 6-7). The major consensus of contemporary theory suggests that
there are positive effects of financial sector development on economic growth although
financial development without providing the necessary sound financial institutions can
foster financial instability (Spratt 2009).
2.2.2.1. The Bond Markets and Financial Intermediation
Economic theory on financial intermediation has primarily been covering the role of
equity and bank debt in corporate finance. The macroeconomic effects of bond markets
and their respective development have not seen that much exposure. To analyze the
effects on the economy we will refer to the model of bonds, bank debt and equity by
Bolton and Freixas (2000). They created a financial markets model that incorporates
equity, bonds and bank debt under asymmetric information, that covers the finance
decision of corporations with different amounts of risk as well as a supply of bank debt
based on the costs of intermediation. The model demonstrates the decisions of companies
to choose the optimal capital structure. Risky firms, such as start-ups, are only able
to fund themselves through the issuance of equity or are otherwise unable to obtain
funding. Firms that are still risky, but relatively safer, are able to finance through bank
debt. Bank debt provides a flexible way of finance, as it is renegotiable and banks have
the special expertise to assess the risk adequately. The safest and most established firms
use the bond market to obtain cheap finance as they only face a small premium since
their possible bankruptcy costs are negligible or very low. Those safe firms are thus able
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to circumvent the intermediation costs of banks.
Three interesting implications result out of this model: At first the finding that the
cost of intermediation is an important factor in the determination of bank loan supply.
When these costs, represented by the interest rate spread (the difference between the
lending and deposit rate), are small and able to generate a large enough supply of
bank loans, the need for equity-finance diminishes (Bolton and Freixas 2000, 342). The
second finding is that when firms issue too many junior bonds banks have an incentive
to inefficiently liquidate the firm since their bank debt is senior to these bonds. This
difference in debt priority also handicaps the renegotiation and restructuring of bank
debt and bonds (Bolton and Freixas 2000, 337). The most important finding is related
to the fact that banks face costs of raising capital themselves. For this reason banks
will try to securitize the part of the bank loan that is the most safe to free their balance
sheets to reuse this capital more efficiently. The standard explanation of securitization
used to see the role of securitization in monitoring and pooling small loans into bigger
securities. This finding enhances this explanation, and sees securitization additionally
as an option to provide banks a possibility to free their balance sheets from the most
safest assets and use the capital instead where the return is higher (Bolton and Freixas
2000, 338-9).
Now what are the benefits of a corporate bond market and why should governments
seek to establish such a market? According to this theory the absence of a corporate bond
market has negative effects on economic growth. The costs on GDP growth relates to
the opportunity costs of not having a well established liquid bond market that supports
sophisticated instruments such as securitization. The absence of such a market leads to
an inefficient capital structure in firms: safe firms will have to use bank debt to finance
themselves. This is more costly for both, firms (they face higher costs of capital since
banks have to charge a spread on their own costs of capital) and banks (they can use
their capital not efficiently and have to keep safe low-yield debt on their balance sheets),
than the possibility to finance through the bond market or respectively securitize the
safe assets. A corporate bond market consequently facilitates investment and allows
society to put capital to more efficient use.
The bond market also allows to finance huge long-term projects, such as infrastructure
investments, more easily. This is very relevant for the East Asian region as the banking-
based financial system came to its limits already prior to the AFC: Large companies
with big infrastructure projects and huge needs for finance had difficulties financing their
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projects without giving control and partly ownership to banks, a problem that could have
been circumvented by an established bond market (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai
2006, 40).
There exist several strands of theory that answer whether the development of the
financial sector has a positive effect on economic growth. We expect, according with
the economic mainstream, that financial intermediation in general, and the bond mar-
ket specifically, have a positive effect on the allocation of capital and consequently on
economic growth. Recent empirical research support these expectations.
2.2.2.1.1. The Empirics of Financial Intermediation While the theoretical debate
about the effects of financial intermediation on the economy has been going on for over
a century the empirical research has been gathering pace only more recently. Research
grew mostly due to an increased availability of data as well as more robust quantitative
methods. Levine (1997) created one of the most comprehensive empirical and theoretical
research that demonstrates the positive link between financial development and long-
run economic growth for all three parts of the domestic financial markets. The central
functions of financial intermediaries that establish this positive relationship are the mo-
bilization of savings, the management of risk, the obtaining and providing of information
and the facilitation of exchange (Spratt 2009, 52). Similar comprehensive research over a
large number of countries, and specifically on the influence of bond market development
on economic growth have not yet been published, mainly due to the lack of available
data (Barth et al. 2006, 12). Instead most of the available research focuses on equity
or bank debt. Analyses of corporate bond market development, especially for the East
Asian region, have been scarce.
2.2.2.2. Financial Stability
The most pressing issue of financial stability with regard to the corporate bond market
is that the absence of a functioning bond market may foster instability. As this section
will show, this is a major conclusion the East Asian countries drew from the AFC. The
development of a corporate bond market has since then been an aim of high priority.
2.2.2.2.1. Fragile Financial Systems Asian financial systems experienced heavy fi-
nancial turmoil during the AFC due to maturity and currency exposures in their balance
sheets. Preceding the AFC strong inflows of capital were enforcing the already strong
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economic growth. The problem was even more exaggerated by the fact, that Asian
savers had only little opportunities to invest their savings locally. Instead they invested
mainly in dollar-denominated foreign-assets, which in return were “recycled” back into
Asia in the form of short-term finance. As bank-lending was the dominant form of fi-
nance, banks used short-term foreign-currency liabilities to finance their local business,
mainly local long-term infrastructure projects. This resulted in the so called “double
mismatch” problem, consisting of a maturity (liquidity) and a currency mismatch: With
a sudden stop of capital inflows it became increasingly hard for banks to refinance their
short-term loans in order to keep up their long-term oriented local business (maturity
mismatch). Simultaneously, they financed their debt in foreign-currencies (mainly US
dollars) but had their core business, returns and claims still denominated in their local
currency. The sudden appreciation of foreign currencies exposed the banks to massive
exchange-rate risks (currency mismatch). The double mismatch made both refinance
and repayment nearly impossible and fed back through the financial system and into the
“real economy”, causing a downward spiral (Ismail and Sivalingam 2006, 28).
These experiences of the AFC have heavily influenced the desire of East Asian coun-
tries to develop their domestic bond markets. The chairman of the Fed during the AFC,
Alan Greenspan, coined the common term of the missing “spare tire”: East Asia’s fi-
nancial system was heavily reliant on banking as a form of intermediation. When this
channel broke down the region was lacking a backup source of financial intermediation.
“The lack of a spare tire is of no concern if you do not get a flat. East Asia had no spare
tires.” (Greenspan 1999).
Since then a functioning bond market was seen as this designated spare tire that
could assuage or even prevent future crises. Because domestic local currency- and for-
eign currency-denominated bond markets can provide finance in the right currency and
maturity so that governments and companies can finance themselves in accordance with
their project’s maturity and currency exposure. This limits fragilities in the national
balance sheets.
But bond markets could also provide a channel through which Asian investors could
invest their savings directly in Asia instead of the need to recycle them back into the
region. This view was already shared within Asia before Greenspan made the common
remarks mentioned above. In 1998 the then financial secretary of Hong Kong, Donald
Tsang, cited the lack of a robust and efficient Asian bond market as one of the main
reasons for the turmoil of the AFC. The establishment of an efficient, diverse and robust
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financial system in Asia has at least since then been a concern for policy makers and an
issue for regional cooperation (Park and Wyplosz 2010, 76).
2.2.3. Financial Integration and the Bond Market
Integrated financial markets are believed to have several potential benefits. Countries
can reap these benefits from opening up their markets to foreign investors and integrating
either regionally or internationally. Financial integration is defined by Baele et al. (2004)
as follows:
“The market for a given set of financial instruments and/or services is fully
integrated if all potential market participants with the same relevant char-
acteristics
1. face a single set of rules when they decide to deal with those financial
instruments and/or services;
2. have equal access to the above-mentioned set of financial instruments
and/or services; and
3. are treated equally when they are active in the market.”
(Baele et al. 2004, 6)
For East Asian bond markets to be fully integrated they have to fulfill all the conditions
above: the first condition is that they either have harmonized rules and regulations or
have to be integrated into one single offshore market. The second condition depends
first and foremost on the de facto and de jure possibility to move capital into these
markets. This condition is termed openness and is closely related to the liberalization
of a country’s capital account (Corbett 2010, 101 and 97). It is necessary to distinguish
between de facto and de jure openness since even though a country can have a de facto
open capital account there may be other obstacles that prevent equal access of investors
and capital from moving freely. And vice versa, countries may have a de jure closed
capital account but actors may de facto find a way to circumvent them. The third
condition needs states to treat all market-participants equally, by this foreign investors
should not face any specific impediments for bond markets to be fully integrated.
Assuming a de jure integration, investors from different juristictions should all assert
the same price to an asset. This is called the “law of one price”, a strong implication of
the financial integration definition. The law of one price implies, that in fully integrated
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markets, assets, with the same risk and generating the same cash flow, should be traded
at the same price, independent of the issuer. For this measurement it is very important to
choose comparable assets, which have the same risk characteristics, and to take exchange-
rate risk into account (Baele et al. 2004, 13). Similar approaches regarding yields, shocks
and portfolios can all be used to measure the de facto degree of integration.
Full de facto integration is not even achieved in the European Union’s bond markets,
although the degree of integration increased rapidly after the introduction of the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union (Baele et al. 2004). East Asian bond markets are expected to
be far less integrated than the European Union, given capital controls, different legal
traditions, financial institutions and regulations.
2.2.3.1. Benefits of Bond Market Integration
Regional or international financial integration can have several beneficial effects on bond
markets, as the investor base is broadened liquidity is increased. Additionally new op-
tions become available to domestic actors, such as regional risk-sharing and consumption
smoothing. The following section gives a brief overview of the benefits of bond market
integration.
2.2.3.1.1. Increased Liquidity The major benefit of regionally integrated markets is
an increase in liquidity, due to increased market participation and a broader investor
base. As liquidity is crucial for the efficiency of a market and the information content
of price signals, financial integration can tremendously improve the domestic markets
(Borensztein and Loungani 2011, 54). And since institutional investors in less developed
markets often have buy-and-hold strategies, foreign market participants are more likely
to trade and thus increase the liquidity in the secondary market significantly (Peiris 2010,
3, 7). For countries with small domestic bond markets increased foreign participation
would also allow to issue larger amounts of debt and diversify the investor base (Black
and Munro 2010, 106).
Extended liquidity in the secondary market reduces transaction costs and the pre-
mium investors have to demand on the yield in order to account for the potential of
illiquidity when they want to sell the asset. Higher integration and foreign participa-
tion thus potentially decreases the yield in the domestic markets. Peiris (2010) tests
this proposition with regard to emerging markets in general, including some East Asian
bond markets. He finds that on average a “1 percentage point increase in the share of
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foreign investors in the government bond market will tend to lower yields by about 6bps
on average” (Peiris 2010, 13).
2.2.3.1.2. Consumption Smoothing and Risk Sharing Ever since the development of
Milton Friedman’s permanent-income-theory it has been widely accepted that economic
agents try to smooth their consumption over time. As economic agents lend money in
“bad” times, they save money in “good” times to achieve this smoothing effect. The
same concept can be applied to whole countries or companies, which accordingly lend
or save in international capital markets in order to smooth domestic consumption. By
allowing capital markets to play this counter-cyclical role, financial integration can help
to increase welfare and smooth economic growth, especially when economic shocks are
only temporary in nature (Age´nor and Montiel 2008, 484-485).
Both the government and the corporate bond market can thus be a transmission mech-
anism that allows to smooth consumption over time. In times of crisis governments often
prefer to run fiscal deficits in order to support the domestic economy. Simultaneously,
corporations and domestic financial institutions consolidate their finances and try to
increase their equity. In times of crisis domestic actors may thus be reluctant to lend.
Foreign actors can provide the necessary capital to smooth consumption in this situa-
tion. Although East Asian economies are heavily dependent on trade and consequently
equally susceptible to trade-driven shocks. Johansson (2008) finds that correlation- and
volatility levels in the East Asian debt capital market indicate that investors can benefit
from diversifying their portfolio regionally.
2.2.3.1.3. Enhanced Macroeconomic Discipline The benefit of enhanced macroe-
conomic discipline is directly linked to the positive impacts of capital flows. As in-
ternational capital markets are rewarding good and penalizing bad economic policies,
countries will have more incentives to follow good economic behavior, drop unsustain-
able macroeconomic policies and reduce the occurrences of economic mistakes when
integrating into the international capital markets. Good policies will not only foster do-
mestic growth but additionally attract foreign capital and by this boost investment and
growth. But increased capital flows without the necessary macroeconomic discipline can
also have the reverse effect on the economy and may foster financial instability instead
of boosting robust growth (Age´nor and Montiel 2008, 488).
This argument is also directly linked to yields in the government bond market. As an
extended participation of foreign investors drives policy makers to have sound macroe-
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conomic policies in order to keep yields low. Governments furthermore are not able to
force foreign investors to hold government bonds (financial repression) and are forced
by this to have more sustainable policies. It is moreover necessary to have convincing
monetary policies that keep inflation low in order to keep a a long-term involvement
of foreign investors. The induced lower government bond yields and macroeconomic
discipline are both having positive effects on economic growth.
2.2.3.2. Financial Stability
As the East Asian countries already experienced during the Asian financial crisis, liber-
alization and increased participation in the international and regional markets may also
expose the economy to new risks and be a potential source of economic instability.
2.2.3.2.1. Fragile Financial Systems Although the access to foreign capital provides
domestic economic agents with additional sources of finance, it seems to come at the price
of making financial systems more fragile. Especially, short-term portfolio inflows seem
to increase the volatility of capital movements and prices, they are also to be susceptible
to rapid movements, herding of investors and very easily affected by contagion, for
example due to a loss in investors confidence (Age´nor and Montiel 2008, 491). Age´nor
and Montiel (2008, 493) identify the possibly destabilizing effect of an uneven pattern
of lending of foreign banks. This argument can similarly be adapted for the corporate
bond market: foreign investors may limit their investment in corporate debt with low
credit-ratings and concentrate only on the highly rated part of the market, in order to
avoid risk. Such an uneven distribution in the debt-capital market would be likely to
decrease the efficiency of the financial system and may also have an adverse effect on
overall output and growth.
2.2.3.2.2. Institutional Weakness Institutional weaknesses, especially the problem
of asymmetric information between foreign investors and domestic actors, can lead to a
miss-allocation of capital. This miss-allocation of capital inflows can have an impeding
effect on long-term growth and even be a source of financial instability if used to finance
speculative investments or investments of poor quality. The destabilizing effects can also
be a result of already existing distortions in the domestic financial system (for example
due to poor regulations, supervision or corporate governance). This emphasizes the
necessity to establish good regulatory practices along the side of liberalizing the capital
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account (Age´nor and Montiel 2008, 490).
2.2.3.2.3. Flaws in the Structure of International Financial Markets International
financial markets may have structural shortcomings that can lead to financial instabil-
ity. For one there is a certain pro-cyclicality of capital flows, that especially effects
developing economies. While foreign investors may invest heavily during a boom, they
might be reluctant to invest in “bad” times. This structural flaw may cancel the effect
of consumption smoothing and, even worse, cause additional instability in the domestic
financial systems (Age´nor and Montiel 2008, 491). The experiences of the AFC demon-
strated this effect for the East Asian countries. During the global financial crisis, East
Asian countries faced similar pro-cyclical capital outflows as investors in the EU and
the US tried to consolidate their balance sheets. Another structural source of instability
is the problem of original sin. This has already been dealt with specifically in section
2.2.1.3.2.
2.3. The Determinants of Bond Market Development
After the AFC, the fact that East Asia did not have developed bond markets which
could have mitigated the crisis was heavily discussed in academic literature. In order to
shed more light on the development of bond markets in emerging countries, and partic-
ularly in Asia, Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2006) conducted a comprehensive
empirical study on the determinants of bond market development. Similar studies on
the determinants of bond market development have been conducted by Dickie and Fan
(2005), Burger and Warnock (2006), and most recently Bhattacharyay (2011). The fol-
lowing section will take a look at the most important endogenous determinants of bond
market growth. These will be empirically examined for the East Asian region and the
period after the crisis in chapter 4. The first subsection deals with macroeconomic- and
the second section with institutional factors.
2.3.1. Macroeconomic Factors
Size of the Economy The size of the economy seems to be an important factor for bond
market development, as small economies may face more difficulties due to the lack of a
minimum effective scale, that provides sufficient market participants and liquidity. Small
markets may also be more volatile as single orders and investors have a larger impact on
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the market. As increased volatility and insufficient liquidity require investors to charge
an additional premium could also make the market unattractive to issuers of bond debt.
Especially in the early stages of development the size of the economy is expected to
be positively related to bond market development (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai
2006, 44-45).
Developmental stage of the economy The stage of development encompasses several
explanations. More developed economies usually have more stable investment environ-
ments that encourage long-term financing and thus bond market lending. Heavy gov-
ernment involvement in the financial system that disturbs or discourages market lending
is also more prevalent in less developed countries. The level of economic development
(mostly measured in GDP per capita) is furthermore associated with better developed
financial institutions, like creditor rights, corporate governance and rule of law. Figure
A.1 depicts a scatter plot of bond market size relative to economic development in East
Asia (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai 2006, 46).
Exchange Rate Stability Exchange rate volatility makes it less attractive for foreign
investors to invest in a bond market because it increases the exchange rate risks in-
vestor face. Additionally domestic corporations, that rely on trade, are more exposed
by a volatile exchange rate. A stable exchange rate makes investments more attractive
to foreign investors and is thus positively associated with bond market development
(Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai 2006, 47-48).
Inflation High inflation is associated with an unfriendly investment environment in
which both companies and investors face higher uncertainty. Bond market development
is expected to be negatively related to high levels of inflation. Empirical research by
Burger and Warnock (2006) found that in a large sample of economies stable inflation
benefits the establishment of bond markets.
Interest Rate Spread, -Variability and -Level A high interest rate spread makes long-
term investments less attractive as investors perceive a high risk that their purchasing-
power of fixed long-term bonds may diminish in the future. The interest rate spread
is thus negatively associated with bond market development. Similarly, a high interest
rate variability has negative effects on investors’ appetite for long-term fixed-rates bonds.
Interest rate variability can also be related to low liquidity in the securities market, when
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a small number of orders or participants may easily be moving the bond market. Finally,
high interest rates also depress investment, make it harder for firms to service debt and
are therefore negatively associated with bond market development (Eichengreen and
Luengnaruemitchai 2006, 47) and (Bhattacharyay 2011, 7).
Large Firms There seems to be some sort of relationship between the amount of large
companies in a economy and the debt market. Large firms are able to access the debt
market more easily than smaller companies as they can issue on a “name” or reputation
basis and are less likely to fail than smaller enterprises. Dickie and Fan (2005) find
that a larger number of firms, that are listed in the Global Fortune 500, contributed to
market development.
Pension System Another factor adding to bond market growth and development
through a more diverse investor base is the type of pension system a country em-
ploys. Defined-benefit-schemes (DBS) are often not or only partially funded, instead
they frequently go hand in hand with a pay-as-you-go method of financing. In contrast,
defined-contribution-schemes (DCS) invest all the payments and are thus by definition
fully funded. As bonds are less risky, volatile and more long-term oriented than stocks,
the bond market is an attractive supplement for pension funds, especially as govern-
ment bonds are often regarded as one of the safest assets in an economy. Dickie and
Fan (2005) find that countries with a DCS tend to have bigger corporate bond markets
(Dickie and Fan 2005, 8, 12).
In East Asia, the distribution of DCS and DBS pension systems are evenly matched
(see table A.9). At a first glance there seems to be no clear relationship between countries
that employ a DCS pension system and the stage of development of the corporate or
public debt markets in the East Asian region. For example Korea uses a DBS system but
has one of the most developed debt markets in the region. Indonesia in contrast has a
DCS system but only a weakly established debt market. Possible additional explanatory
variables are the size of the pensions contribution, which are very low in countries such
as Indonesia and Thailand and high in Malaysia or Singapore. Or the levels of built-up
assets for future pension benefits, that are high in Malaysia, Korea and Singapore, all
countries with well established bond markets (see figure A.6) (Donghyun 2009, 9).
Fiscal Policy The most obvious determinant of the size of the government bond market
is the fiscal policy conducted by a country. Traditionally government debt is constituting
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the largest part of the government bond market, as countries finance their public debt
primarily through the issuance of bonds. Section 2.2.1.1 already gave an overview of
alternative, more inefficient ways, to finance government debt. As government debt is a
major component of the government bond market the relationship is obviously positive.
But it is also well explored in economic literature that government debt can raise interest
rates and consequently crowd-out private investment, with possible negative effects on
the private bond market (Brunner and Meltzer 1972; McCauley and Remolona 2000;
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai 2006).
2.3.2. Institutional Factors
Origin of legal system Legal traditions vary across East Asian countries. Different
legal systems could provide some explanatory power of the uneven levels of bond market
development in the region. La Porta et al. (1998) find that countries with a common
law tradition have stronger protection of investor rights than countries with a civil law
tradition. Stronger protection of investors also fosters the development of the financial
markets in general and the securities market in particular. With weak investor rights,
savers are also more likely to invest through the banking system instead of the bond mar-
ket, since banks are more capable to enforce their claims in a weaker legal system. It is
thus expected that legal systems may have an impact on bond market development. Em-
pirical research by Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2006) was ambiguous whether
this provides a strong relationship, especially in Asia.
Bond- and Bank Debt — Complement or Substitute? It has been mentioned al-
ready, that a corporation’s finance decision basically consists of three options. Issuing
equity is usually considered to pose the danger of costly dilution of capital. Therefore
this option is not as often used as the option to finance through debenture capital.
So the essential finance decision is one between bond- and bank debt. The empirical
research of Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2006) was the first to mention a po-
tential complementary relationship between the banking sector and the bond market.
They showed that countries with a more developed and healthy banking system also had
bigger bond markets. Both the banking system and the bond market tend to develop
together (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai 2006). It has been shown above how the
banking sector can benefit from the existence of a liquid corporate bond market: It
allows banks to move more towards an investment-banking-type model. As banks are
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usually also handling the issuance of corporate bonds, the bond market may foster the
banks’ move towards a more fee-oriented business.
There is however academic research that suggests that the banking system and the
bond market are potential substitutes. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that strong
interest groups are an important factor in financial development and large established
incumbents and rent-seekers can severely slow down or even reverse the process of fi-
nancial development5. Dickie and Fan (2005) test this theory on 34 bond markets in
developed and emerging countries, including several Asian countries. They propose that
bond markets may take good lending business away and lead to a deterioration in lend-
ing quality for established financial intermediaries. Strong banking institutions may
thus impede the development of a corporate bond market. Their findings indicate that
countries with banking systems that are strongly concentrated have less developed cor-
porate bond markets. Countries with low bank concentration6 in East Asia are Japan,
Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. Singapore, the Philippines and Vietnam have a high
bank concentration.
A similar argument can be made with regard to the openness of an economy. With
increasing openness entrenched interest groups and rent-seekers become less powerful due
to international competition. It is consequently expected that more open economies also
have larger bond markets, as banks and other interest groups will not be able to impede
the development of a securities market as much as in a more closed economy. Openness
is traditionally measured as the share of imports and exports of GDP (Eichengreen and
Luengnaruemitchai 2006, 45).
Corporate Governance Whereas overall structural and macroeconomic factors are ma-
jor determinants, the establishment of good corporate governance practices has often
been seen as an important part of financial development. The AFC especially triggered
the academic discussion on whether and how poor governance practices played a role in
the crisis.
Corporate governance is mostly associated with stockholders and not as much with
participants in the bond markets. Nevertheless, there are certainly spill-over effects
between good practices towards owners (such as stakeholders) and creditors. A firm
that is regarded as having good disclosure of information on the equity market is likely
5This is also mentioned and considered in Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2006).
6Bank concentration is measured as the share of the three largest banks’ assets of total commercial
bank assets.
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to be able to provide good information to its creditors as well. This is underpinned by
Byun (2007), who finds that firms with perceived better governance also face lower costs
of debt capital in Korea. As a result it is likely that the establishment of good corporate
governance structures fosters the establishment of debt markets.
Ananchotikul and Eichengreen (2009) test this hypothesis for emerging market eco-
nomies, with Asia being a subsample. They find that corporate governance has a positive
effect on the market capitalization of the private bond market, but not on the public bond
market. Although the Asian subsample appeared at first to not support this hypothesis,
this resulted solely from two outliers, Malaysia and the Philippines. For the rest of
East Asia there seems to be a positive exogenous effect between corporate governance-
and corporate bond market development. Research by Lin et al. (2012) comes to a
different conclusion. They argue that firms under weak corporate governance conditions,
especially firms that are largely under family control, try to avoid the monitoring of
banks. Because monitoring is dispersed and thus not as efficient due to duplicated
and dispersed costs in the bond market, firms rather engage in the debt market to
bypass extensive auditing. According to this research, weak corporate governance has
important influence on the firms’ finance decision, which are more likely to issue in the
debt markets.
Given that good corporate governance has both an exogenous and endogenous effect
on financial development it is more likely for the positive effects of good corporate
governance to outweigh the possible channels of avoiding monitoring and control as a
determinant for bond market growth. But more research would be necessary to assert
this proposition with more certainty.
In the East Asian region the development of corporate governance has been het-
erogeneous. According to calculations of the NLU corporate governance indicator7 by
Ananchotikul and Eichengreen (2009), there have been improvements in corporate gover-
nance in the decade after the AFC. But they moved at a slower pace in the Asian region
than for example in Latin America. And within the East Asian region these improve-
ments are unevenly distributed: The index has been rising in Hong Kong, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. It has been stagnating in Indonesia and Korea
and actually declining in China (Ananchotikul and Eichengreen 2009, 152-153).
7This indicator consists of the availability of disclosed information by companies, the co-movement of
stocks and a measure of how frequently poor cash-flow performance is being concealed.
33
Contract Enforcement and Rule of Law Bond markets seem to benefit from similar
macroeconomic and institutional environments as banking systems. Creditor rights that
are rigidly enforced and accompanied by a strong rule of law benefit market-based fi-
nancial systems as they protect investors and provide certainty for bond owners. Burger
and Warnock (2006) found in a large sample of economies that stable inflation, rigid
creditor rights and a strong rule of law benefit the establishment of bond markets. They
also found that countries with weaker creditor rights tend to rely more on borrowing in
a foreign currency.
Structural factors in an economy, such as the prevalence of corruption can have an
impact on market development as well. Issuers of debt may face a higher risk-premium
when the likelihood of corruption is high; higher costs may in turn deter firms from
issuing bonds. Similarly can civil liberty and economic freedom have a positive effect
on competition and by this provide more competitive prices as well as a more certain
investment environment (Khalid and Rajaguru 2010, 7).
Khalid and Rajaguru (2010) test the impact of several socio-economic factors on bond
market development empirically. They included developed economies in their regression,
but also had a separate sample with East Asian economies. Their results were uniform
over all subsamples and showed that lower corruption and higher economic freedom and
civil liberty had a positive effect on bond market development. Consequently, East Asian
countries could foster bond market growth by enforcing corruption laws more rigidly and
granting more economic freedom and civil liberty. Table A.5 depicts the world-ranks
of East Asian countries regarding several indicators of doing-business, corruption and
economic freedom. The countries that fare well in these indicators are in most cases
countries with more developed bond markets. As the protection of investors, the orderly
resolving of defaults, low corruption and economic freedom is positively associated with
bond market development there is still plenty of room for several East Asian countries
to improve. This is especially relevant for the countries of China, Indonesia, Thailand,
the Philippines and Vietnam, which suffer from a lack of investor protection, relatively
high corruption and lower economic freedom.
Government Commitment Another interesting finding by Dickie and Fan (2005) is
that one of the most important contributing factors to bond market development is
the outspoken commitment of governments to establish a corporate bond market. As
governments have the capacity to shape financial infrastructure and the institutional
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framework they perform an important role in building the debt market and preventing
situations in which the corporate bond market is held hostage by a few large established
institutions. Malaysia and Korea have been actively supporting the development of their
respective bond markets. Malaysia created the Malaysian Provident Fund to manage the
retirement savings and also established a national mortgage corporation for securitization
of small loans. Korea’s approach was more gradual, mostly consisting of government-
provided credit guarantees for large industrial conglomerates (chaebols). These measures
all facilitated the development of the local debt market (Dickie and Fan 2005, 5).
2.3.3. Determining Factors in East Asia
While most empirical research focuses on the determining factors of bond markets in
developing countries, only Bhattacharyay (2011) conducted research specifically on the
East Asian region. Other research, such as Ananchotikul and Eichengreen (2009), Dickie
and Fan (2005), Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2006), used East Asia countries
only as part of their bigger sample. As Bhattacharyay (2011) exclusively considered
macroeconomic factors in his research, this thesis will extend the analysis to institutional
factors and use a larger time period.
In order to determine the driving factors, a multivariate analysis is conducted using
cross-sectional panel-data. The size of the East Asian bond markets is used as the
dependent variable, whereas indicators representing the influence of macroeconomic and
institutional factors are used as the independent variables. The next section describes
the econometric method used to estimate the multivariate regression. The analysis itself
can be found in chapter 4.
2.4. Methodology
This short section will give a quick overview of the most important econometric methods
used in the empirical part of this thesis. It will also deal with the statistical problems
faced and the appropriate solutions applied.
2.4.1. The GLS Estimator
The most basic estimator used in many econometric studies is the OLS(Ordinary Least
Squares)-Estimator. One statistical assumption in the OLS model is that the errors are
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“independent identically distributed” (this is abbreviated as “iid”, in statistical terms
V (y) = V (u) = I ∗ σ2). With panel data this assumption easily becomes problematic:
Panel data consists of different entities (countries in this case) which errors are most
likely not iid over the different sections. The GLS (Generalized Least Squares)-estimator
provides a possibility to deal with this problem. Instead of assuming V (y) = V (u) =
I ∗ σ2, we only have to assume that V (y) = V (u) = V , with V being a known positive
definite matrix. As the variance matrix is in most cases unknown, GLS uses the sample
to estimate a variance matrix and this matrix to estimate the coefficients. This method
is termed “Feasible GLS”, but is most commonly still simply called GLS. The GLS- is
usually more consistent than the OLS-estimator but comes with a stronger assumption
of the relationship between the regressors and residuals. While OLS assumes that the
residuals are not correlated with the regressors (E(X ′u) = 0), GLS assumes that no
element of the regressors is correlated with any other element of the residuals (E(X⊗u) =
0) (Wooldridge 2002, 49-57, 127-129, 143-162).
The next two subsections will deal briefly with statistical problems that will be faced
in the empirical part of the thesis. The problems of heteroskedasticity, serial correlation
and cross-sectional correlation.
2.4.1.1. Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation
Heteroskedasticity is present in a sample, when different sub-samples’ error terms have
different variances. In our case heteroskedasticity either means that different coun-
tries have different variances in their error terms, or the variance of the error term
varies over time. Heteroskedasticity can have several underlying reasons, such as model-
misspecifications and omitted variables. The presence of heteroskedasticity does not
effect the consistency of the OLS- or GLS-estimator, but accounting for it provides a
more efficient estimation. It also affects the estimation of standard errors and may thus
lead to wrong inference when not being accounted for. As the major concern in this
thesis is to test whether several factors have a significant influence on our dependent
variables, hypothesis testing and the required unbiased standard errors are of a high
concern (Wooldridge 2002, 125-128). To test for heteroskedasticity, a likelihood-ratio
test between the model accounting for heteroskedasticity and a homoskedastic model is
conducted (Wiggins and Poi 2003).
Serial correlation, also known as autocorrelation, is present when the error terms of
a model are correlated. As with heteroskedasticity, the standard errors become biased
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and lose robustness (Drukker 2003). Additional ways to deal with serial correlation are
either to estimate the model including a lagged dependent variable or an autoregressive
term (AR(1)) for the errors. While the GLS-estimator is theoretically appropriate to
deal with serial correlation on its own, Beck and Katz (1995) show that the practically
used feasible GLS-estimator may underestimate the variability of coefficients by up to
300 %. But Keele and Kelly (2006) also find that dynamic models that include a lagged
dependent variable in the presence of high auto-correlation tend to underestimate the
coefficients of the true underlying process. The statistical justification of which method
to use thus relies on the specific encountered situation.
The theoretical justification of a dynamic model seems easy in the context of bond
markets, as bonds usually have a maturity of over one year. Only a fraction of the debt
matures in a given year and the other part is still outstanding in the following year. The
lagged variable and the autoregressive error term would be capturing this outstanding
debt.
To test for serial correlation in the first place the Wooldridge-test for serial correlation
in panel data is conducted in this thesis (Wooldridge 2002, 282-283).
2.4.1.2. Cross-sectional Correlation
While heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are well explored in literature, recently
more literature focused on common shocks and common unobserved components that
panel data is likely to face. In such a case the error terms are correlated across the
different panels. This is termed cross-section correlation or cross-section dependence.
Under the assumption that a common factor, which is not observed and uncorrelated
with the regressors, exists, the standard-estimator is not efficient (although still con-
sistent) and standard errors biased, when cross-sectional dependence is not accounted
for. The underlying source of such common shocks may be explained by common social
norms, neighborhood effects and other genuinely interdependent effects (De Hoyos and
Sarafidis 2006, 482-483). As the used panel data is of regional nature and there has
been increased global and regional economic integration as well as active regional efforts
to develop bond markets, it seems easy to explain possible cross-sectional effects in this
particular case. To test for cross-sectional correlation the Pesaran test for cross-sectional
dependence will be used as described in De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006).
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2.4.2. Data
We analyze panel data of the ten East Asian countries, which are involved in the regional
initiatives to foster bond market development. The dataset was assorted out of various
different sources. Most notably data from IFS (2012), Kaufmann et al. (2010) and
World Bank (2012b) was used. A detailed overview is given in the appendix C, in table
C.1. The dataset ranges over the period of 1995-2010 at best. Data availability for all
countries and indicators is a serious impediment for many statistical methods. Balanced
panel data8 is available only for the period of 2000 to 2010 for the dependent variables.
Data for all regressors is available continuously and balanced only for the period of 2002
to 2009, but varies for most groups of indicators.
Section 2.3 gave an overview of the theories on which macroeconomic or structural
variables influence bond market development. Again, the availability of data is a major
obstacle to test these theories in the East Asian region. Bhattacharyay (2011) was also
limited by continuous data. We nevertheless extend Bhattacharyay’s model by several,
mostly institutional, variables. As noted above this inclusion of additional variables
leads to a smaller period of a continuous and balanced sample, but will allow us to make
broader conclusions in the end.
The most notable differences between the data used in Bhattacharyay (2011) are that
we use a different data source for exchange rate variability and use the sum of exports
and imports as a share of GDP as the openness indicator (instead of solely exports).
Bhattacharyay’s sample ranges from 1998 to 2008, the used continuous sample in this
thesis ranges from 2000 to 2010, but pooled data is available from 1995 to 2010.
It should also be noted, that no series for government debt or fiscal policy was in-
cluded in the analysis, as no sufficiently large time series was available. Eichengreen and
Luengnaruemitchai (2006) used it to test for robustness of the results, Bhattacharyay
(2011) did not include government debt or fiscal deficit as well.
Approach and Outline
The following chapter (3) will examine the state of the corporate- and government bond
markets according to the dimensions of size and liquidity, the potential benefits of bond
market development examined in section 2.2 and the state of regional integration. While
8Panel data is balanced when each indicator is available in every cross section (country in this case).
(Wooldridge 2002, 250)
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determining the current state of the market, three hypotheses of determinants will be
formulated. Chapter 4 establishes the empirical model to find the most important deter-
minants for bond market growth for East Asia. Along institutiona and macroeconomic
factors the three hypotheses proposed are included Chapter 5 summarizes and concludes.
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3. States of the Market
The East Asian bond markets came a long way since the Asian financial crisis. Whereas
government debt was either primarily denominated in a foreign currency or held in
the form of bank debt, sovereign bonds increasingly became a common instrument to
finance government debt or to conduct monetary policy in the region since 1998. As
the local bond markets developed, East Asian governments could finance their debt to
a greater extent in their own currencies. The corporate bond market evolved as well.
Virtually no corporate debt was issued in the lesser developed East Asian countries before
the crisis, and in the more developed countries like Korea corporate debt was limited
to state-owned-enterprises or large industrial conglomerates (like the Korean chaebol).
Since then the corporate bond market became an alternative source of finance in many
economies in the region. The growth rates of the market illustrate this development.
From 1998 to 2011 the Government bond market grew by 500 % and the corporate bond
market by 255 %, leading the market total of outstanding bonds to grow by 435 % in
absolute terms. The three biggest economies of the region – China, Japan and Korea
(CJK) also account for the major part of the market, roughly 95 % of the overall East
Asian bond market (ABMI 2010c, 5).
Despite the rapid growth rates, the development has been uneven throughout the
East Asian region. Bond market growth differed throughout countries, as well as their
respective markets. The following sections will take a close look at the current state
of the market as well as the development since the Asian financial crisis. The first
two sections discuss the government- and the corporate bond market, regarding their
size, their liquidity, the role they play in the economy and the implications for financial
stability. The observations made in these two sections will lead to the formulation of
three hypotheses that will be econometrically tested in the next chapter. The third
section will examine the current state of regional integration as well as regional efforts
to further develop the market.
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Total Outstanding LCY Bonds in East Asia
(excluding Japan, billion US $)
Source: AsianBondsOnline
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Figure 3.1.: Bond Market growth in East Asia, excluding Japan.
3.1. The Government Bond Markets in East Asia
The East Asian domestic bond markets grew rapidly in the last decade. The aim to
establish a liquid and well-functioning government securities market, denominated in
the local currency, has been advanced to an important target of financial development
for Asian countries.
The market did indeed grow and develop remarkably during the last decade. Although
the region had high rates of economic growth, the government bond market even outgrew
GDP growth. From December 2000 to 2010 the LCY market grew by 255 % (13.5 %
annualized) in absolute terms.
3.1.1. Size and Liquidity
Given that GDP also grew rapidly in the East Asian region during the last decade, the
size of the government bond market over GDP grew more modestly. Table 3.1 shows
the government bond market as a share of GDP. The two biggest economies of the
region, China and Japan, roughly doubled their outstanding government bonds. As
did Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Vietnam, that started with virtually
no government bonds outstanding in 2000 established bonds as a new instrument of
government debt. The Philippines bond market peaked in 2004 and overall stagnated
in the decade. Indonesia’s market was the only market that actually shrank in the last
decade, having less than half as many bonds outstanding in 2010 as in 2000. Hong
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Kong’s market was stagnant and peaked during the GFC when Hong Kong issued large
amounts of government debt (Chen 2009).
Table 3.1.: LCY Government Bond Market as % of GDP in East Asia
Date HK CN ID JP KR MY PH SG TH VN
Dec 2000 8.2 16.6 35.4 84.3 25.7 38.0 31.1 26.6 22.8 0.3
Dec 2001 8.8 17.7 29.8 97.5 27.3 43.1 33.8 34.1 25.9 0.6
Dec 2002 9.2 22.9 26.2 111.9 26.8 44.0 36.9 35.8 32.0 0.8
Dec 2003 9.7 26.5 24.7 122.3 32.0 48.4 39.4 37.7 31.1 2.2
Dec 2004 9.5 31.0 21.9 135.3 39.9 46.1 40.9 37.9 32.6 3.5
Dec 2005 9.2 36.4 17.1 147.2 45.9 44.4 40.1 37.4 37.6 5.0
Dec 2006 8.9 38.9 18.8 148.4 49.2 43.6 36.6 37.2 39.3 8.3
Dec 2007 8.5 42.1 18.4 146.7 47.8 48.9 33.8 36.7 44.1 13.4
Dec 2008 9.4 42.5 14.3 149.8 45.2 42.1 32.2 39.0 42.9 15.0
Dec 2009 33.3 42.3 15.0 164.5 48.5 51.0 31.9 46.4 52.1 12.2
Dec 2010 38.9 39.6 13.1 168.3 47.3 58.2 31.3 43.6 54.4 13.6
Source: AsianBondsOnline (2012a)
Compared regionally, Japan’s market of government debt accounts for over 75 % of the
overall market. This results from it’s large share of regional GDP as well as it’s incredibly
high amount of government debt. China, Japan and Korea together accounted for 95 %
of the total market in 2010. When taking a look at liquidity, most markets fared well.
Table 3.2 shows two measures of liquidity in the East Asian government debt markets.
Table 3.2.: Liquidity in the East Asian Government Bond Markets (2011)
CN HK ID KR MY PH SG TH VN
Government Bid-Ask-Spread 4.00 4.70 32.90 0.70 3.30 5.30 3.80 3.30 33.50
Government Turnover Ratio 0.63 18.98 0.34 1.16 1.08 0.62 0.50 0.58 0.64
Source: AsianBondsOnline (2012a) and AsianBondsOnline (2011)
When comparing liquidity measures Korea overall has the most liquid markets with
the lowest bid-ask-spreads of all countries in the East Asian region. This probably stems
from the fact that Korea is the only country that managed to successfully establish a
centralized trading of government bonds through the Korean Exchange (KRX). Even
though China, Hong Kong, and most recently Singapore tried to establish such an
exchange, Korea’s is the only one that sees high volumes of trade. (ADB 2012a, Vol. 1,
Part 1, p. 10)
Except for Vietnam and Indonesia the other markets overall also have liquid markets
with only minor bid-ask-spreads. One particularity that stands out is the incredibly high
turnover ratio of Hong Kong government bonds. This results because government bonds
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are used in the Hong Kong exchange fund, which is used to actively manage the Hong
Kong currency board. The low Chinese government bond turnover-ratio is probably due
to the fact that Chinese banks are required to hold large amounts of reserves, as reserve
requirements are an important tool for monetary policy by the PBC. Unfortunately the
dataset does not include the Japanese government bond market.
Vietnam and Indonesia are the countries most lacking behind in bond market de-
velopment. As the size of their markets, indicators of liquidity are remarkably low.
Bid-Ask-Spreads are roughly 10 times higher than it’s Malaysian counterpart. And In-
donesia also has the smallest turnover ratio of the region. Even though historical data
on government bond liquidity for most countries is only available since 2005, a modest
improvement in turnover ratios throughout the region can be observed. Significant de-
velopment of bid-ask-spreads could also be achieved in the Philippines, that stood at
47.5 in 2000 and was down to 5.3 in 2011. Indonesia’s spread also closed down from 100
points in 2000 but increased again after reaching a low of 16.9 in 2006. (ADB 2006, 30)
The investor base in government bonds consists primarily of long-term oriented insti-
tutions. Figure 3.2 denotes the investor profile for six East Asian countries. The major
participant in most markets are banks, especially in the Chinese market, where over 70
% of the investors are local banks. Except for Indonesia, which issues a large amount
denominated in US dollar, roughly 70 to 80 % of the market is made up by long-term
oriented institutions. As these investors tend to hold their assets until maturity, liquidity
in the secondary market is potentially low.
Investor Prole of East Asian Government Bonds
Source: AsianBondsOnline
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Figure 3.2.: Investor Profile of East Asian Government Bonds
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Overall government bond liquidity improved in the region. But although transaction
costs decreased over the last decade, turnover-ratios only developed modestly. As most
investors in government debt, such as local banks and pension funds, follow a buy-and-
hold strategy, liquidity in the secondary market can still be improved.
3.1.2. Yield Curve Development
Section 2.2.1.2 showed that government bond markets are believed to have several spill-
over effects on the overall economy, the most important spill-over effect beeing an es-
tablished yield curve. When such a yield curve exists in an economy investors can gain
information on how the market percepts future interest rates and prospects of growth.
In order to have a reliable yield curve that provides valuable information to investors it
is necessary for governments to issue bonds on several different maturities. For yields to
be meaningful sufficient liquidity in the markets is also necessary, otherwise obscurities
in the yield curves, such as sudden jumps on a particular maturity, may occur.
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Figure 3.3.: Maturity Structure of Government Securities as of September 2011
Figure 3.3 depicts the maturity profile of government securities. It reveals how East
Asian governments finance themselves. For most countries the focus lies on short-term
finance. Korea and Malaysia issued only about 13 %, Hong Kong only about 10 % of
their debt with a maturity over 10 years. Since the liquidity in these markets is higher
than in most other East Asian markets, this should not impede the establishment of a
yield curve. Vietnam issued not even 3 % with this maturity. Taking into consideration
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that the Vietnamese market is not yet very liquid this should provide an opportunity
for the development of a more efficient yield curve in the country.
Overall every country in the region managed to establish a yield curve, although
low levels of liquidity remain an issue in some maturities and economies. Figure 3.4
depicts the yield curves of countries in the East Asian region. The yield curves of China
and the Philippines experienced the obscurity of jumps in the the covered year. With
sufficient liquidity, the yield curves should smooth and provide more stable and reliable
information to investors.
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Figure 3.4.: Yield Curves in East Asia
The benefits of such a curve on the economy seem to not to be distributed evenly.
The benefits of a yield curve as a predictor diminish in countries that are very small
or have close financial linkages to economies like the United States. This could be the
case when a country has a form of currency peg or managed floating to the US Dollar.
Mehl (2006) finds that the domestic yield curves of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and
Singapore generally have at least at one horizon (short-, medium- or long-term) some
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predictive content on growth or inflation. He also finds that the US yield curve has an
influence on domestic growth in these economies1 and, except for the case of Singapore
and Korea, has a causal relationship with the domestic yield curve (Mehl 2006). Since the
study had to deal with the fact that the domestic yield curves in Asia had not been fully
established in 2006 and there had been issues with lacking liquidity in those markets, the
positive effects of the Asian yield curves is expected to be even more significant today.
Since then government bond markets have deepened and yield curves developed in the
East Asian region. Today the East Asian yield curves, except for a few cases of certain
maturities, are able to provide valuable information to investors in the region.
Hypothesis I: The development of the government debt markets has positive
externalities on the corporate bond market
As we will determine the major factors of corporate bond market growth in East
Asia (chapter 4), the hypothesis that the development of government bond market
has a positive effect on the development of the corporate bond market will be tested.
3.1.3. Monetary Sterilization
The biggest part of the overall tremendous growth in the East Asian bond markets can
be attributed to a stellar rise in outstanding government securities. The government
bond market has continuously outgrown the corporate bond market (as can be seen in
figure 3.1). To assess the overall state of the government bond market a few important
questions come to mind: Why did the government debt markets grow so rapidly over
the last decade, even managing to outgrow the already high GDP growth? And why
did government debt double in countries like Korea and Singapore, even though these
countries had a positive budget balance for most of the decade? This section will show
that the sterilization efforts of East Asian central banks were responsible for a large part
of bond market growth in East Asia.
It is argued, that a large part of East Asia’s government bond market growth was
driven by the sterilization efforts of central banks when accumulating foreign exchange
reserves. These sterilization efforts were necessary to not succumb to high inflation
rates induced by persisting capital inflows into the region. Capital kept flowing into
1Which certainly stems from the fact that many Asian countries rely heavily on exports to the United
States.
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East Asia (except for a short period during the global financial crisis) because central
banks avoided the appreciation of exchange rates and instead built up massive foreign
exchange reserves. To avoid inflation, most of these foreign exchange accumulations
were sterilized by the purchase of government securities or issuance of central bank bills.
All these attempts drove government bond market growth in the region. But continuous
sterilization efforts can have serious negative effects on the economy.
Since the AFC, East Asian countries have built up substantial foreign exchange re-
serves (as can bee seen in table A.3). To a certain extent, this build-up served the
purpose of insuring against another event like the AFC. But by now, there is a large
consensus that the amount of exchange reserves is well beyond what is considered com-
mon or plausible to avert another crisis. Park and Estrada (2009) even came to the
conclusion that East Asian foreign exchange reserves are excessive. One major effect
of this build-up is that the appreciation of many Asian currencies has been mitigated.
Large amounts of capital inflows (often aggravated by low exchange rates) induce a rise
in liquidity in the domestic financial system. As this can lead to inflation in consumer
or asset prices, central banks often face a potential conflict with their policy objective of
a stable or managed exchange rate. They overcome this dilemma by draining liquidity
from the domestic financial system. Lo¨ﬄer et al. (2012, 8) state that no later than 2001,
all central banks in the region had to deal with superfluous liquidity in their domestic
financial systems, due to the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.
In section 2.2.1.1 we mentioned three different ways for central banks to cope with
excessive liquidity in the financial system: By either increasing reserve requirements
of domestic banks, by using the market-based instruments of issuing central-bank bills
themselves or by coordinating with the government to sell government securities.
Table A.4 gives an overview of the instruments used in East Asia to sterilize the
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. Except for China, most central banks have
resorted to open market operations as the primary technique of their choice. China
uses a combination of bank reserve management and central bank bills to manage the
monetary base instead. Indonesia and the Philippines also resort to such a combination,
but overall favor market-based instruments (Lo¨ﬄer et al. 2012).
As all bonds that are issued either directly by the government, the local governments
or the central bank, are listed as government bonds, the efforts of sterilization have
effectively driven a large part of government bond market issuance in East Asia.
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Hypothesis II: Sterilization efforts are driving bond market growth in EA
As we will determine the major influences on bond market growth in East Asia in
chapter 4, the hypothesis that central banks’ sterilization efforts were an important
factor in government bond market growth will be tested.
Korea is an example of a central bank issuing primarily bonds in order to sterilize
liquidity. Figure 3.5 depicts the development of the market. The market for monetary
stabilization bonds, that are issued by the Bank of Korea in order to manage the money
supply, grew slower (235 % from 2001 to 2011) than the overall government bond market
(332 % from 2001 to 2011). But the market for stabilisation bonds still accounted for
a third of the market in 2011 (down from 40 % 10 years earlier) and hence is still a
major factor in the overall market. The reversal of capital flows and the extensive use
of fiscal policy during the global financial crisis have certainly contributed to this recent
development.
Structure of Korean Government Securities
(trillion Won)
Source: ECOS
100
200
300
400
500
600
Monetary Stabilization Bonds
Foreign Exchange Stabilty Fund BondsIndustrial Finance DebenturesNational Housing Bonds
Treasury Bonds
20
11
/1
2
20
11
/0
1
20
10
/0
1
20
09
/0
1
20
08
/0
1
20
07
/0
1
20
06
/0
1
20
05
/0
1
20
04
/0
1
20
03
/0
1
20
02
/0
1
20
01
/0
1
Figure 3.5.: Korean Government Securities by Type
As mentioned, China uses a combination of measures for monetary sterilization.
Greenwood (2008, 209) shows that the reserves of banks deposited at the People’s Bank
of China (PBC) and the issued stabilization bonds are roughly the same as China’s
foreign exchange reserves. Since the markets for central bank bills have been a major
part of overall government securities growth, it is necessary to assess what implications
these development have on the economy.
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Costs and Benefits of Sterilization Bonds
The immediate benefits of sterilizing the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves are
clear: On the one hand the build-up of reserves is insuring the countries’ currencies
against a sudden depreciation. That the reserves of East Asian countries are considered
to be excessive, has already been mentioned. On the other hand the intervention in
the foreign currency market keeps the East Asian currencies from appreciating. This
gives the exporting sector in the region a competitive edge. Without sterilization these
policies would lead to inflationary pressure, that could have damaging effects on the
economy.
The growth of the government bond market can have external effects on the economy.
It has already been shown, that an established yield curve can have positive effects on
the economy. Nyawata (2012) however notes that these benefits can only be reaped
when primarily treasury bonds (T-bills) are used for sterilization. As this is only one
way of sterilizing, the usage of T-bills requires either an already well-developed market
(so that large amounts of selling do not impact the market) or close cooperation between
the government and the central bank. As most markets were only little developed in
East Asia when central banks had to begin their sterilization efforts, countries like Korea
resorted primarily to the use of central bank bills and China to bank reserves. Singapore’s
government managed to coordinate with the Monetary Authority of Singapore (the
central bank) and used T-bills for sterilization (Lo¨ﬄer et al. 2012).
Although the issuance of T-bills or central bank bills contributed notably to the growth
and development of the East Asian government bond market, there are a number of
downsides to this development. First and foremost, it should be mentioned that the
underlying reserve accumulation leads to a miss-allocation within the domestic economies
as well as the global economy. Because the accumulation impedes domestic spending
and instead directs it towards the foreign exchange reserves. Additionally, it results in
a miss-allocation of global trading patterns and favors the domestic export sector at the
cost of domestic demand (Greenwood 2008, 210).
Mohanty and Turner (2006, 49) also note that there may be negative externalities
by the rapid growth of virtually risk-free government securities. The large supply of
these papers could crowd-out private sector issuance and thus dampen the growth of the
corporate debt capital market. In countries where there is only little initial public debt,
the issuance of T-bills could, in contrast, have a positive effect on the economy.
With the AFC, the fact that regional investments were flowing overseas and were being
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recycled back into the region came under scrutiny. And the theory that the development
of the East Asian bond market can be a possible solution for this problem was advanced
(see for example Corbett (2010, 95)). In part the government bond markets in East
Asia did not grow because investors suddenly started to invest heavily within the region
instead of overseas. But because central banks actually sterilized the assets that were
recycled back into the economy. It should be considered that the massive growth of
regional debt markets has partially been driven by central banks. In this case the growth
of the government local bond market does not express the solution to a problem, but
becomes a symptom. The critique remains valid, that private savings that are invested
in a functioning regional bond market would be more profitable for the region than the
public savings (foreign exchange reserves) that are invested in low-yield foreign assets.
As foreign exchange reserves are usually only invested in highly liquid and low-risk assets
it is casted into doubt whether the sterilization is profitable overall.
By giving out central bank bills or by issuing T-bills to be sterilized, either the central
bank or the government itself has to pay a coupon for the issued bonds. These are the
public costs that arise from the holding position of foreign exchange reserves. These are
called the “costs of carry”. Since the central bank in return is also investing its exchange
reserves in secure high-liquidity foreign assets, the yields of these assets can offset the
costs of carrying (Mohanty and Turner 2006, 44-46). As an example Figure 3.6 shows
the spread between the yield on US T-bills and the government securities2 for China,
Japan and Korea.
As can be seen the yield spread for both the Chinese and Korean central bank bills are
positive. This indicates that the central bank will have a balance sheet loss from issuing
central bank bills and in turn holding US T-bills as foreign exchange reserves. For Korea,
this also shows that a managed exchange rate and capital mobility is colliding with the
interest of an independent monetary policy (i.e. setting interest rates). As China has
imposed capital controls independent monetary policy should not conflict with the policy
of a fixed exchange rate. Japan’s yield spread is about zero in the short-term indicating
only little costs of carrying. A prolonged spread on domestic interests payed to sterilize
and the income from foreign assets can weigh heavily on a central bank’s balance sheet
and may thus impose high public costs. Table A.4 indicates the years in which East
Asian central banks had to take losses on their balance sheets.
Independent central banks usually try to avoid losses because they avoid to be in
2Central Bank Bills have, as T-bills usually a very similar yield as government securities.
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Costs of Carry: Yield Spread with US-T Bonds
(percent spread, time to maturity)
Source: AsianBondsOnline, own calculations, Data as of March 6th 2012
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Figure 3.6.: Exemplary Costs of Carry
need of a recapitalization from the government. As it could have substantial impact on
the independence of a central bank, because it constitutes a source of conflict between
the government and the central bank and damages the central bank’s reputation. By
needing new capital ultimately the independence of a central bank can be challenged by
such losses. (Lo¨ﬄer et al. 2012, 1, 12)
Another threat of balance sheet losses comes through the possibility of appreciation of
the domestic currency. By the revaluation of foreign exchange assets, the central bank
would suffer a loss that could be a substantial part of GDP. All these losses eventually
have to be be borne by the public: Either directly, when the government pays coupons
for the sterilized government securities. Or indirect, when the central bank has to be
recapitalized (Mohanty and Turner 2006). Nyawata (2012) argues that it is less hurtful
when the losses are borne directly by the government. East Asian central banks had to
take losses several times in the last decade, as can be seen in Table A.4. Lo¨ﬄer et al.
(2012) cite the example of the Bank of Korea:
For instance during the period from 2004 to 2007 the Bank of Korea accumu-
lated interest rate losses of roughly 0.5 percent of GDP. In the same period
the revaluation adjustment account increased to a book loss of 1.7 percent
of GDP. The revaluation account records valuation gains and losses accruing
during a predefined period until the gains/losses are realized. (Lo¨ﬄer et al.
2012, 16)
This example shows, that the growth of the government securities market by the issuance
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of monetary stabilization bonds can be a burden to the economy. When the governments
or the central banks decide to unwind the sterilized liquidity, the suppressed inflation
may start to emerge. The result could be a similar scenario as Malaysia in the mid-
1990s: Increased liquidity induces rapid credit growth and inflationary pressure. These
developments could additionally be exaggerated by inflows of hot money that anticipate
an appreciation of the exchange rate (Greenwood 2008, 212-213).
Central bank bills and government bonds used to sterilize currency interventions have
greatly shaped the East Asian bond market. They are responsible for a large amount of
the growth in these securities and they pose the risks of losses to governments. They also
skewed the maturity structure towards short-term bonds. Central banks issue short-term
bonds more favorably for sterilization, as it is easier to unwind sterilization by letting
the bonds mature and because it is more costly to issue longer term bonds (due to a
higher long-term interest rate). A part of the skewing towards short-term maturity that
was observed in Figure 3.3 thus can be explained by monetary sterilization.
Also Hong Kong’s sudden jump in outstanding government bonds over GDP in 2009/2010
can be attributed to the coordinated efforts of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and
the Hong Kong government to sterilize liquidity that was induced to avoid an apprecia-
tion of the Hong Kong Dollar (Chen 2009). That most central banks in the region used
bonds to conduct monetary policy shows that the government securities market did not
only develop quantitatively but also developed qualitatively in the last decade. It shall
however again be mentioned, that these sterilization methods can also turn out to be a
burden on the East Asian economies.
3.1.4. Financial Stability
While the usage of government securities has the least disturbing effects on the economy,
it still can be a source of financial instability in the region. Two forms of financial
instability are of importance when dealing with the government bond market, possibly
unsustainable macroeconomic policies and flaws in the structure of international financial
markets.
Unsustainable Macroeconomic Policies
The first potential source of financial instability at hand is excessive government debt
that would manifest itself in the government bond market. The only country in East
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Asia with massive public debt is Japan. In a global context, only Zimbabwe has a higher
public debt to GDP ratio. Nevertheless Japan is able to pay only a very small yield on
its government bonds. The persisting political influence in the Japanese postal savings
system is the major determinant for this circumstance. The postal savings system was
primarily used to channel savings towards economic development projects and served as
a “second budget” for the Japanese government. Since the Japanese government bond
market grew rapidly in the last two decades the postal savings system remains of crucial
importance to Japanese policy-makers. Although there has been persisting pressure
for reform of the postal savings system, the Japanese government debt would quickly
become unsustainable when yields would rise due to a reform (Amyx et al. 2005).
This dependence represents a form of financial repression as described in section
2.2.1.1. As actors are forced to hold low-yielding government assets instead of investing
them more efficiently, the economy is suffering a welfare-loss. Additionally, the artifi-
cially low yield of Japanese government bonds is keeping the Japanese government from
being forced to reform its public finances and lower its public debt to sustainable levels.
Another potentially destabilizing macroeconomic policy is the persisting build-up of
foreign exchange reserves and the accompanied sterilization of excess liquidity. It has
already been shown that these policies can cause high losses to the economy, potentially
threaten central bank independence, disturb domestic financial markets and skew the
economy towards investing instead of consuming. Mobility of capital, in the long run, is
incompatible with the objective of prolonged reserve accumulation and sovereign mone-
tary policy (Mundell 1963). Sterilization is hence only postponing the adjustment of the
domestic price level or the exchange rate (Greenwood 2008, 214). Sterilization can even-
tually be impossible to achieve when balance sheet losses become unmaintainable. The
unwinding of sterilization and the readjustment of the economy can have wide-ranging
negative effects on economic growth in the domestic economy. This is certainly a threat
to East Asian economies. And with the maturing of central bank bills (to unwind steril-
ization measures), which usually have a very short maturity, growth in the government
bond market is dampened. In this sense, we can make certain predictions about future
government bond market growth. When central banks in the region start to unwind
sterilization and stop to further accumulate foreign exchange reserves, they will not roll
over sterilization bonds anymore. This will be releasing bottled up liquidity into the
financial markets and will certainly cause a receding government bond market3.
3In order to inject liquidity, the PBC has already started to unwind some of its sterilization measures.
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Original Sin
An issue with government debt for developing countries is the problem termed “original
sin”, it describes “a situation in which the domestic currency cannot be used to borrow
abroad or to borrow long term, even domestically.” (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999,
3). As the Japanese Yen is one of the five currencies that dominate the international
markets Japan is naturally free of original sin, but the other East Asian countries may
all suffer from original sin. With the increasing internationalization of the Chinese
Yuan, China may also be redeemed. Two major empirical works on original sin have
been published: Eichengreen et al. (2005) is the original empirical application of the
original sin hypothesis, it covers the timespan from 1993 to 2001. Hausmann and Panizza
(2011) updated their previous research for the period up to 2008. Table A.2 depicts the
results of Eichengreen et al. (2005) for the periods before and after the AFC4. As can be
seen, Japan is the least effected country by original sin, whereas most other East Asian
countries have nearly all their public debt denominated in a foreign country. Prior to
the AFC, even Singapore, a major financial center, was not able to issue debt in its own
currency. This led to the currency and maturity mismatches experienced during the
AFC. After the crisis, the effects of original sin started to recede, as can be seen in Table
A.1. This trend occurred internationally, with an even stronger effect on Asian than
Latin American countries. Nevertheless, developing countries still find it hard to finance
themselves internationally without exposure to either a maturity- or currency mismatch.
According to Hausmann and Panizza, the only country that has been redeemed from
original sin in Asia is Thailand. It is able to finance more than 15 % of its public debt
internationally in its own currency (Hausmann and Panizza 2011, 32). But looking at
data from foreign holdings in LCY bond markets, both Malaysia and Indonesia were able
to convice foreign investors to buy domestically denominated government securities. A
fourth and even a third of government bonds were held by foreigners in Malaysia and
Indonesia respectively (see Figure A.3).
Instead of financing internationally, the majority of Asian countries increasingly relied
on their domestic markets for finance. This could as well mean redemption from original
sin, because with the opening-up and integration of capital markets it gets harder to
distinguish between foreign and domestic debt. Since all actors are participating in the
From July 2010 to June 2012 central-bank-bills and -bonds outstanding decreased by 63 %.
4OSIN1 and OSIN3 are indicators to estimate the degree of original sin. Zero means that there is
no external funding in foreign denominated securities and loans. One depicts that there is solely
funding in a foreign currency. For a detailed description see Eichengreen et al. (2005).
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same market and the ultimate holder of debt cannot be definitely identified (Panizza
2008). But Hausmann and Panizza (2011) find that this is not case. They identify
that instead of being able to convince foreign investors to participate in the domestic
markets, developing countries became increasingly abstinent and borrowed less in the
international markets and accumulated large amounts of foreign exchange reserves in
order to decrease the possibility of a currency mismatch.
Additionally, when resorting to external finance, Asian countries have to borrow
mostly short-term when using the local debt markets. As was shown, the maturity
structure of many East Asian countries is dominantly short-term oriented. Only In-
donesia and the Philippines were borrowing over 40 % of their debt in a horizon over
10 years5. Korea, Hong-Kong and Vietnam even had to finance about half of their debt
with a maturity of one to three years. A part of this can be explained by the short-term
nature of monetary sterilization policies, but this may also continue to indicate that
many Asian countries still face the danger of a maturity mismatch. As Eichengreen
(2004) notes “original sin” is a structural characteristic of international markets that
can not be avoided by domestic actors or policies.
3.1.5. Summary
Until the break-out of the global financial crisis (GFC), the growth of East Asian bond
markets was primarily driven by the sterilization efforts of central banks. The market
grew by 242 % between 2001 and September 2007 (20 % annualized). With the global
financial crisis, the reversal of capital flows reduced the need for sterilization. As the
economy was suffering from a massive reduction in world trade, fiscal policy was used
to support the economy. This led to a boost in bond market growth. In absolute terms
the LCY government bond market grew by 52 % between September 2007 and 2010 (15
% annualized). In the wake of the GFC, the market shrank in terms of size to GDP in
China, Indonesia and the Philipines.
The overall state of development in the market can be assessed quite positively. All
East Asian countries managed to establish a domestic local currency bond market for
their government securities. Although there remains potential for market development
(for example by trying to skew the issuance of government bonds into longer-term matu-
rities), the experience of the global financial crisis shows that East Asian countries were
5Indonesia only started to switch it’s maturity structure to long-term finance in mid 2010 and has
been issuing US-dollar denominated debt for this maturity
55
able to use the domestic bond market to finance fiscal policies smoothly. East Asian
markets also started to be liquid enough to establish a benchmark yield curve that can
have positive externalities on the economy. But room for the development of market
liquidity still remains in the whole region.
With reasonable liquidity in the market central banks are also able to use the govern-
ment bond market to fine-tune the monetary supply (except for Indonesia and China
who still resort heavily to reserve requirements as a tool of monetary policy). The major
downside of government bond market growth is that a large part has been induced by
central bank’s efforts to sterilize the liquidity resulting from the accumulation of foreign
exchange reserves in the region. As most countries (with the most notable exception of
China) have been using market-based techniques for sterilization this drove the growth of
government securities. The downside of these sterilization bonds is that they could im-
pose sizable costs on the economy and threaten central bank independence. Sterilization
efforts may thus become a source of financial instability in the region.
Japan is the only country facing the problem of excessive government debt, a special
form of financial repression is preventing these unsustainable debt levels to cause serious
problems. As there seem to be more efficient capital allocations in the Japanese economy
the policy of holding postal savers captive buyers of government bonds certainly leads
to a welfare loss in Japan. With the exception of Japan, excessive debt is no problem in
the region. Another possible source of instability is the problem of original sin for many
East Asian countries. Next to Japan, only Malaysia and Indonesia were able to borrow
in their own currency from foreign investors. As long as the countries in the region have
large saving rates this may not be a source of instability.
The development of the regional government bond market is assessed positively in the
last decade, although there remains potentials for further developing market liquidity.
There are numerous potential beneficial externalities to the economy. The major po-
tential burden comes with the immense sterilization efforts of East Asian central banks.
With a widening yield-spread between the US, EU and Asia, this may increasingly effect
the Asian economies.
3.2. The Corporate Bond Markets in East Asia
Whereas the East Asian government bond markets grew rapidly over the last decade,
corporate bond market growth has been more modest. The following sections will ana-
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lyze how the corporate bond market, its liquidity and its role in financial intermediation
in East Asia developed over the last decade. As concerns for financial stability are a
major driving force of governments’ attempts to develop the corporate bond market, the
last section will review the experiences of the global financial crisis, that was the first
major test to East Asian corporate bond markets.
3.2.1. Size and Liquidity
In absolute size the market grew by 95 % from December 2000 to December 2010 (an-
nualized 6.9 % growth). As GDP also grew rapidly in this period, the ratio of the
corporate bond market to GDP actually declined from 21.4 % in 2000 to 17.6 % in 2010.
The corporate bond market thus was not able to mimic the rapid development of the
government bond market on a regional level.
Table 3.3.: Corporate Bond Market as % of GDP.
Date CN HK ID JP KR MY PH SG TH VN
Dec 2000 0.3 27.6 1.4 24.0 48.8 35.2 0.2 20.9 4.5 0.0
Dec 2001 0.3 29.2 1.1 23.3 54.2 41.1 0.1 30.4 4.9 0.0
Dec 2002 0.6 32.4 1.2 21.7 53.2 34.2 0.1 29.6 5.1 0.0
Dec 2003 0.8 35.4 2.3 19.8 47.9 36.6 0.3 30.5 7.7 0.0
Dec 2004 1.3 37.6 2.6 18.4 42.3 31.5 0.7 30.6 7.3 0.0
Dec 2005 2.8 38.8 2.1 17.5 42.1 33.0 1.0 28.8 8.1 0.0
Dec 2006 3.8 41.8 1.8 16.6 45.1 33.0 1.7 28.9 11.1 0.0
Dec 2007 4.3 38.8 2.0 16.8 50.8 35.9 2.2 28.8 11.0 0.5
Dec 2008 5.6 33.3 1.5 17.3 55.0 35.5 2.7 29.0 11.0 0.7
Dec 2009 9.1 35.4 1.6 19.0 62.5 42.4 4.4 27.8 13.2 1.2
Dec 2010 10.6 34.0 1.8 18.8 63.1 40.4 4.3 27.9 12.9 1.8
Source: AsianBondsOnline (2012a)
The development of the market has also been very diverse withing the region. Table 3.3
shows the development as a share of GDP in the respective markets. Whereas China’s,
Korea’s and Thailand’s market grew rapidly, Japan’s market declined significantly while
the markets in the rest of the region only outgrew GDP modestly.
A major obstacle to the development of the East Asian corporate debt markets is
the lack of sufficient liquidity in the secondary markets. Bonds usually have the fun-
damental benefit of being tradable securities. Investors who need immediate liquidity
could theoretically sell their bonds in the secondary market instead of holding them
until maturity. This requires an established secondary market with sufficient liquidity.
East Asian countries were able to establish such a market for government securities.
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Even though there remains room for further enhancing liquidity in these secondary gov-
ernment debt markets, participants in the market can count on sufficient liquidity. In
contrast to the government securities market, the East Asian countries were not able to
mimic this development in the secondary markets for corporate debt.
Table 3.4.: Liquidity in the East Asian Corporate Bond Markets (2011)
CN HK ID KR MY PH SG TH VN
Corporate Bid-Ask-Spread1 6.90 28.10 70.00 1.70 8.20 52.90 19.00 9.90 103.10
Corporate Turnover Ratio 1.23 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.18 0.12 - - 0.04
1 Spreads for primary issuance.
Source: AsianBondsOnline (2012a) and AsianBondsOnline (2011)
The two indicators for the East Asian government and corporate bond markets can be
seen in table 3.4. Bond turnover ratios are – with the exception of China – significantly
larger in the government bond market and particularly small in the corporate market.
The indicators show that the corporate debt markets lack breadth – only a small fraction
of bonds is being actively traded. Asian institutional investors instead prefer a buy-
and-hold strategy which leads to poor liquidity in these markets and a large liquidity-
premium. The bid-ask-spreads are already high for primary issues in the corporate
bond markets, and still higher than off-the-run government bond bid-ask-spreads (not
in table). There is also a lot of heterogeneity throughout the market. Whereas Vietnam,
Indonesia and the Philippines are at the lower end of the liquidity spectrum, China,
Korea and Malaysia are the most liquid markets in the region. But the lack of liquidity
is still a pressing issue in the whole region. This is why according to the ADB Bond
Market Liquidity Survey 2011, participants throughout the East Asian corporate debt
markets think that the diversification of the investor base is one of the most important
issues in the development of the market. As “in many cases corporate bond liquidity is
limited to the months immediately following issuance” (AsianBondsOnline 2011, 12).
A major reason for this lack of liquidity is the absence of a diverse and active investor
base in the East Asian markets. Detailed data about the investor base is scarce for
the corporate bond market in the region, but it is dominated by banks, pension- and
insurance funds, that hold securities mostly until maturity. In China, banks account for
over 50 % of the investment in the corporate bond market; insurance and other funds
account for another 40 % of the market. In Korea, the investor base is far more diverse,
banks account for only 21 % of the investor base and pension- and insurance funds for
another 32 % (ADB 2011).
In the last decade there has been only little improvement in liquidity. Although
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liquidity data over the last decade in the corporate bond market is patchy at best,
turnover ratios have been stagnant throughout the region at a very low level, except
for China. This is a serious issue for the market. The lack of liquidity significantly
reduces the efficiency of the market, as investors have to price-in a liquidity-premium.
Consequently, yields are increased and possible issuers crowded out. An increase in
liquidity, especially through the diversification of the investor base is the most important
challenge that East Asian corporate bond markets face.
Another aspect of the corporate bond market is the maturity of securities. Issuers face
certain costs of issuance and have to oblige to given reporting criteria for participation in
the public debt market. As these costs are fixed, they diminish relative to the maturity
and volume of the bond. Issuing short-term debt is from this perspective more costly
than issuing long-term debt. Bank finance is also a potent substitute for short-term
lending and the bond markets are most efficient at providing large volumes of long-term
finance (as in theory risk can be transfered easily by selling the bond). Figure 3.7 shows
the distribution of bond maturity in East Asia. Again, a high degree of heterogeneity can
be observed. Many markets are especially short-term oriented. In Hong Kong, Korea,
Thailand and Vietnam over 40 % of all corporate debt is short-term. Notable amounts
of long-term bonds are only issued in China, Malaysia and Singapore. Malaysia’s market
is the market skewed most towards longer maturities. This probably results from their
large Islamic bond market and the long-term orientation of Islamic investors.
Maturity Structure of Corporate Securities
(years to maturity, percent of total)
Source: AsianBondsOnline
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Figure 3.7.: Maturity Structure of East Asian Corporate Bonds
Finally figure A.5 gives an overview of credit rating distribution among internationally
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rated corporate issuers6. The distribution is heavily skewed towards the investment grade
level. This shows that only highly regarded and established firms are able to rely on the
corporate bond market. Lower rated firms tend not to issue public debt.
3.2.2. Financial Intermediation and the Corporate Bond Market
Literature on Financial Intermediation in East Asia
As the vivid academic discussion, whether financial intermediation in general has a
positive effect on economic growth, has recently been backed by empirical research, the
question arises if the positive link between growth and financial development also holds
for the East Asian region.
The little existing empirical literature for Asia and the East Asian region has been in
line with both expectations from economic theory and empirical results for the rest of
the world. Habibullah and Eng (2006) find a strong link between financial sector and
real economy growth for Asian developing countries prior to the AFC7. Fase and Abma
(2003) come to similar conclusions. Estrada et al. (2010) conducted the most recent
study and not only find that increased financial intermediation and sophistication has a
positive effect on per capita growth, but that the impact is relatively higher for Asian
countries than for other developing countries. They also find that the structure of finance
(the ratio of equity, credit and the bond market) does not seem to be important, but
rather financial deepening as a whole. The positive reinforcing relationship between
financial sector development and economic growth has found to be diminishing over
the course of economic convergence (Fung 2009). Estrada et al. (2010) find that this
effect led to a declining positive impact of financial sector development on economic
growth in Asia. They conclude that markets have to switch gradually from mostly
mobilizing savings into more efficiently distributing capital and managing risk. Financial
development is thus still incomplete in Asia. And this finding also implies that sound
financial institutions play a more vital role in this later stage of development, as they
allow a more efficient distribution of capital. Recent empirical research has increasingly
focused on the importance of sound and supporting institutions to guarantee and foster
6Note that the data covers the emerging Asian region, and does include issuances from India and
Pakistan but not Japan.
7The countries include Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand among
some other South-Asian countries. But it seems to be reasonable to side with Estrada et al. (2010,
43): “It would take a leap of faith to view a banking boom characterized by reckless lending and
rapidly deteriorating quality of investment as financial development.”
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the functioning of the finance-growth nexus (Spratt 2009, 50-51).
Empirical research that deals with the specific effects of bond market development is
scarce internationally and non-existent for Asian countries. But international evidence
hints that bond market development can have an overly positive effect on the economy.
Fink et al. (2003) find a bi-directional causality between bond- and real economy growth
in Japan and supply-leading evidence for many other developed countries. A later study
by Fink et al. (2009) finds no significant effects of financial development on developed
European countries but a highly positive effect of financial intermediation growth in Eu-
ropean accession countries. Bond market development also seems to have an outstanding
growth enhancing effect in these emerging countries, even more important than other
sources of finance. Further research for the East Asian region would be necessary, but
it can be expected that bond market development would have a similarly positive effect
on economic growth.
Capital Structure and the Bond Market in East Asia
Although East Asian corporate debt markets grew over the last decades, a closer look
shows that relative to other sources of finance, bond market growth has been far more
modest. Credit provided by the banking sector, together with equity, remained the
most important source of finance in most East Asia countries. Bank credit was actually
significantly outgrowing the economy in China, Hong Kong, Korea and Vietnam and
significantly declined only in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand in the last decade
(see table A.6 for detailed numbers). This indicates that bank-finance is still the most
important form of finance for corporations in East Asia8.
In contrast to bank debt, corporate bond market growth was more heterogeneous
throughout the region (see table A.7 for detailed numbers). Markets that were already
fully or partially functioning before the AFC, such as Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia and
Singapore, outgrew GDP by about 25 % in the last decade. Very small and non-existent
markets, specifically the markets in China, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam kick-
started their development. Most notably, China’s and Thailand’s corporate markets
grew amazingly fast in the last decade. Japans corporate bond market declined in the
last decade, probably signifying the still ongoing process of deleveraging in the economy.
Indonesias market remained below 2 % of GDP almost throughout the entire decade,
8Although banking institutions increasingly turned to households as new clients for credit in many
countries, such as China or Korea.
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but as credit provided by the banking sector in Indonesia receded, the corporate bond
market increased in relative importance.
These figures all show that bond finance remains only a small fraction of overall
finance. It is mainly used by large established firms and has not yet nearly reached the
same importance as in Europe or the United States. It has nevertheless been argued
that East Asia has transitioned from the financing patterns prior to the AFC into a new
market-based form of finance. For example, Rethel (2010) notes that “the role of banks
as sources for new funds declined, at the same time as that of capital markets increased”.
This is only true for the largest and safest cooperations in East Asia. Rethel’s conclusion
is drawn upon aggregated data that depicts the domestic financing profile (see figure
A.4). These numbers are computed by relating total bonds outstanding, bank debt and
market capitalization. But this means that this figure depicts the financing profile of
society as a whole and not specifically the financing patterns of cooperations. As has
been shown (in section 3.1.3) total bonds outstanding have been heavily influenced by
central banks’ sterilization efforts of foreign exchange accumulation. These central bank
bonds, as well as ordinary government debt, are skewing the financing profile towards
bond markets.
Domestic Financing Prole
(percent of total, Dec 2001 vs Sep 2011)
Source: AsianBondsOnline
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Figure 3.8.: Domestic Financing Profile, only accounting for Corporate Bonds
Figure 3.8 represents the same data, but without taking government bonds into ac-
count. This should give a more accurate picture of the importance of the corporate
bond market9. The figure shows how heavily the large amount of outstanding govern-
9To depict an entirely correct corporate financing profile from macroeconomic data only the bank debt
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ment debt skewed the importance of Japan’s bond market. It also highlights the relative
importance of the corporate bond market in Korea. This could partly be attributed to
the chronically weak equity market (the so-called Korea Discount), that makes it more
attractive to finance through bonds.
East Asia’s Corporate Bond Market
The overview of the domestic financing profile of East Asian countries revealed, that no
fundamental transformation in financing patterns towards bond markets has occurred in
East Asia over the last decade. Although corporate bond markets have expanded rapidly,
they were not able to outgrow regional economic growth despite plenty of reform efforts
of governments and regional institutions. When compared, the regional corporate bond
market was 21.35 % of regional GDP at the end of 2000, by September 2011 it even
declined slightly to 17.56 % of GDP.
Despite rapid growth in some markets, the share of the market in most countries
remained stable over the last decade. Japan’s market declined, whereas China’s market
grew extraordinarily fast, especially in the last seven years. Vietnam and Thailand
saw a little more modest, but still significant growth in their respective corporate debt
markets. Korea’s market managed to rebound after the market slumped in the wake of
the 2003 credit-card crisis and grew rapidly in the last seven years, discovering even new
highs of issuance volumes. The other ASEAN-5 countries, as well as Hong Kong saw
stagnating or only moderately growing market volumes.
The Japanese corporate bond market is a special case in the East Asian region. It is
the only market that has been shrinking over the last decade as a share of the Japanese
GDP. A study by the Japan Securities Dealers Association (2010) finds several reasons
for this development: Most importantly a combination of an environment with surplus
liquidity and only little demand for external long-term funds in the private sector. At the
same time the banking sector is being supported by various government measures that
leads to a situation in which bank-lending is even cheaper than the issuance of corporate
bonds. In such a situation Japanese firms increasingly use bank-debt for finance and
only use the corporate bond market to roll-over their long-term debt instead of actively
seeking new funding (Japan Securities Dealers Association 2010, 3-5).
The fastest growing market for corporate debt is the Chinese market. It especially
issued exclusively to the corporate sector as well as the equity raised by IPOs should be accounted.
This however is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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took off after the liberalization of the bond market that was marked by the introduction
of the Medium-Term-Note (MTN) programme in 2005. MTNs are similar to corporate
bonds, but with a shorter maturity and they can be issued more easily by borrowers.
And by Chinese regulation, they did not have to be guaranteed by a bank and neither
be approved by a regulatory commission, in contrast to ordinary corporate bonds in
China. In 2008, this regulation was liberalized once again. Since then enterprises do
not need mandatory bank guarantees for bonds anymore and are able to issue medium
term debt more easily. The previous existing quotas for total corporate bond debt have
also been removed. This liberalization drove the rapid growth in the Chinese corporate
bond market (Jianxin 2009).
Regional Share of the East Asian Corporate Bond Market
Source: AsianBondsOnline
VNHKASEAN-5KRCNJP
Dec 2000 Dec 2010
Figure 3.9.: Share of regional corporate bond market
While the Japanese economic activity was only slowly developing, and its bond market
shrinking as a share of GDP, the fastest growth occurred in China and Korea. As the
effects canceled each other out, the overall regional share of the CJK (China-Japan-
Korea) countries remained roughly the same at about 90 % of the whole market. Figure
3.9 shows the change in the regional share of the market. While the CJK countries
are not as dominant in the corporate bond market as they are in the government bond
market (where their share is 95 % of the regional market), they still accounted for 88 %
of the market in 2010. The rapid growth of the Korean and Chinese market was even
offsetting the Japanese decline in market share.
But as China’s and Korea’s corporate bond markets grew rapidly in the last years,
why did the remaining East Asian markets stagnate or develop only inertly in relation to
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economic activity as a whole? Felman et al. (2011) analyze structural as well as supply
and demand factors in order to answer this question for the ASEAN-5 economies. They
found supply- and demand-side issues constraining the faster development of corporate
bond markets.
After the AFC, firms became cautious again, the region’s investment rate plummeted
and increased only partially during the boom in the mid-2000s. The rational for de-
creased investment had different dimensions: Firms had to reduce their leverage, faced
lower returns and greater uncertainty and had a perception that doing business was
not as easy as prior to the AFC. Simultaneously, investors were more reluctant to lend
money, instead investing their money in seemingly more safe options, mainly abroad.
Companies, in turn, increasingly used their own internal cash generation to fund projects.
Enterprises with international ties also heavily relied on their parent corporations for
funding (Felman et al. 2011, 7-8, 29).
This surplus of savings over domestic investment is not only limited to the corporate
sector but is equally present in the government sector. There it takes the form of current
account surpluses and foreign exchange reserves as official investments. However in the
wake of the GFC a certain reversal of this trend can be observed.
3.2.3. Financial Stability – The Experiences of the Global Financial
Crisis
Whether or not the East Asian corporate bond market would be able to play the role of
a “spare tire” remained doubtful for the first decade after the AFC. As has been shown,
only government bond markets were able to be established in sufficient size and structure
throughout the region. The global financial crisis (GFC) that started in 2008 was thus
the first crucial test for the East Asian corporate debt markets. The effects of the crisis
on East Asian countries was mostly transmitted through the channels of international
trade inside the region. Stable, domestically induced growth dampened these effects and
Asian countries were quickly able to rebound from the crisis. The impact of the GFC is
by no means comparable with the events of the AFC, instead it has had a similar effect
as the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2001 on the East Asian economies (Emmers and
Ravenhill 2010, 1-3).
Nevertheless, the GFC challenged the East Asian countries’ financial systems. Global
deleveraging, -instability and a reversal of global financial flows, resulting in outflows
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from the East Asian countries, put the financial system under serious stress. In this
situation the corporate bond market could have played the often cited role of a “spare
tire”. But at first, it could not. At the heights of the GFC, with the collapse of Lehman,
the East Asian debt markets were, as in many other economies, clogged up and illiquid
as trading ceased in many markets and securities. But East Asian bond markets soon
started to function again and showed that they can serve as an alternative source of
finance in the economy. Already before the GFC, East Asian firms were able to borrow
in their own currencies as opposed to the years preceding the AFC. As of today the LCY
corporate debt markets continue to be a source of finance, even in times when local and
international banks are deleveraging (Felman et al. 2011; Chan et al. 2012).
When taking a look at Figure 3.10 it can be seen that in the middle of the GFC Asian
bond markets started to grow rapidly. Table A.8 also shows that many more firms issued
bonds during the crisis than did before the crisis. Felman et al. (2011) see two major
reasons for this development. Although Asian banks’ liquidity and risk-exposure was
never in doubt, they still followed the Western banks and started to reduce the credit
issued in order to reduce their leverage. This actually led to negative corporate credit
growth in 2009. Firms started to substitute the missing bank-lending by issuing bonds
instead. Simultaneously demand overseas for Asian securities grew rapidly (Felman et al.
2011, 15-18). At the first stage of the GFC in 2008 and early 2009, East Asian countries
faced intensive capital outflows that reversed later and were followed by large capital
inflows starting in 2009 (Shim 2012, 8).
Three major factors made the East Asian bond market attractive. On the one hand a
lot of international liquidity exists after Western central banks initiated various programs
to improve investment in their respective economies. On the other hand East Asian
assets have become more attractive as macro fundamentals improved over the last decade
and the region proofed to be robust to external shocks and the global engine for economic
growth (Felman et al. 2011). Additionally, interest rate differentials widened after the
GFC due to different rates of economic growth and thus drew more investors towards
emerging markets (Turner 2012).
Another interesting aspect is that the market base of debt markets changed during
the crisis. As can be seen in table A.8, in the immediate wake of the GFC East Asian
bond issuers turned towards domestic investors and curbed being rated by international
rating agencies. From 2009 onwards, internationally rated bonds returned to pre-crisis
levels. Simultaneously, the overall amount of bond issuers increased dramatically: from
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2007 to 2008 the number of bond issuers grew by roughly 50 %, whereas 2009 that
amount doubled again. 2009 also represents the peak in the breadth of the market base.
This shows that although market growth may have been modest in the years before the
crisis, bond market debt became an option for many firms during the crisis.
Hypothesis III: The global financial crisis had a positive effect on corporate
bond market growth
As we will determine the major factors of corporate bond market growth in chapter
4, the hypothesis that the period of the global financial crisis marked also a period
of stronger bond market growth, will be tested.
Nevertheless, obstacles still remain in the debt markets. As already mentioned, imme-
diately after the Lehman collapse the bond market effectively shut down. Although it
rebounded quickly this shows that East Asia is neither immune to international shocks
nor that liquidity is sufficiently high so that markets would be able to absorb such an
external shock. The second remaining problem showed itself in the aftermath of the
crisis. Only large corporations with a high credit rating were able to fund themselves
through the debt market. Enterprises with a low rating were not able to use the bond
market as easily as high rated companies. This reflects both structural weaknesses still
persistent in the East Asian debt markets, and a general flight to quality in times of
crisis (Felman et al. 2011, 17).
Overall the experiences of the GFC have to be assessed positively. Although there
are still several impediments to well-established markets and many prospects for the
development of the East Asian corporate debt markets, the experience of the GFC
showed that the bond markets could function as a spare tire and thus cushion external
shocks10. Although corporate bond market growth has been approximately at par with
GDP growth in the region, markets still managed to develop. The development of
regional markets has primarily been of qualitative nature and resulted in quantitative
growth during the GFC. As the sovereign-debt crisis persists in Europe, the East Asian
bond markets continue to play a vital role in the region’s financial system: Curbed
European bank lending in Asia is substituted by bond issuances regionally (Park (2012)
examines the Korean case).
10I join here the opinion of Felman et al. (2011), whereas Turner (2012) and Spiegel (2009) are more
pessimistic in assessing this development.
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Emerging Market Corporate Bond Issuance
(billions US $)
Source: Dealogic ACM Analytics as cited in Shim 2012
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Figure 3.10.: Emerging Market’s Corporate Bond Issuance
Although there remains plenty of room for further development, the overall experiences
of the GFC shed a very positive light on corporate bond market development. Given
that the GFC presented itself primarily as an external crisis, transmitted to East Asia
through the channel of international trade, it remains to be seen whether the debt
markets can play the same role in a crisis originating from within the region itself.
3.2.4. Summary
The development of the corporate bond market has been a primary target of East Asian
policymakers. The corporate debt market is believed to be an efficient financial inter-
mediator that mobilizes and distributes savings efficiently in an economy. It may also
fulfill the role of a spare tire in case the banking sector cannot provide loans to the
private sector in times of crisis.
The market grew rapidly in absolute terms, but lacked behind overall growth of eco-
nomic activity in the region. Growth is also distributed very heterogensouly in the
region. Japan remains the largest market but it shrunk as a share of GDP. China’s
market grew most rapidly, even overtaking the fast growing Korean market in 2011 in
absolute size. The lack of liquidity especially in secondary markets remains a major
issue in all markets.
Despite the fast growth of corporate debt, equity- and bank-finance remain the most
important source of finance in East Asia. As banks in East Asia followed their Western
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counterparts and deleveraged in the wake of the global financial crisis, corporate bond
issuance jumped suddenly, despite the crisis. This experience hints that the corporate
debt market did for the first time play the role of a spare tire. But whether it may also
fulfill this role during a crisis originating from within the region remains doubtful.
3.3. Financial Integration and Regionalism in the East
Asian Bond Markets
As East Asian bond markets grew rapidly in the last decade, the region could also poten-
tially benefit from integrating their respective markets. Foreign and regional investors
could provide additional liquidity in the markets and would open up the possibility of
regional risk- and consumption-sharing. In order for markets to be integrated, actors
should face equal access and rules, and be treated equally (see section 2.2.3).
3.3.1. Financial Openness and Integration
Recently, more academic literature has focused on the costs and benefits of financial in-
tegration in general. And although there has been some recent empirical research on the
integration in bond markets and the participation of foreign investors in these markets,
there is not yet a clear assessment whether foreign participation in the debt market has
overly positive effects, due to the lack of data (Daniel 2008). Foreign participation in
the East Asian bond markets has grown (as can bee seen in figure A.3), but still not as
quickly as in other emerging market regions, like the CEE countries (Peiris 2010, 5).
Openness in East Asia
As has been shown above (section 2.2.3) one of the major conditions for financial in-
tegration is that countries allow foreign capital to actually move in or out the market
freely. It is distinguished between between de facto and de jure openness.
De jure capital account openness is commonly measured an index compiled by Chinn
and Ito. The findings of this index for Asia indicate an increasing openness in the
period prior to the AFC but a receding openness after the crisis (Chinn and Ito 2008).
As Patnaik and Shah (2010, 4) note, the more recent progress of openness may not have
been reflected in this measure due to a change in the measure’s definition.11 De jure
11It could also be added that since the index is actually normalized to the two extreme cases (the most
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openness is very diverse in the region. While Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore are fully
open to foreign investors, Thailand and China are far more closed, with the other East
Asian countries lying between those two extremes (Aizenman et al. 2008).
De facto capital account openness is naturally hard to measure. Patnaik and Shah
(2010) constructed an index based on the gross financial flows in the balance of payments
to measure de facto openness. They find that Asia overall continued to increase the de
facto capital account openness after the AFC.
Financial Integration in the Debt Capital Market
There exists a vast amount of literature that assesses the state of integration in the
East Asian financial markets. Because most of this research is focusing on equity or
currency markets, only little academic literature covers both the Asian countries and
their bond markets. The existing research is also exclusively limited to the government
bond markets.
Table 3.5 depicts an overview of major academic research on integration in the East
Asian bond markets. Research on the integration of equity markets in East Asia usually
found that there is a certain degree of integration (Yu et al. 2007b). For the East
Asian bond markets there is only limited indication for advanced financial integration.
Common cointegration models mostly find no or only weak integration among the bond
markets. And there are only weak signs of an increased degree of integration more
recently.
closed country is 0, the most open is 100), I would rather suggest, that other regions were outpacing
Asia in de jure liberalization, no actual reversal had to occur for these results.
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Would markets be integrated, investors would hold a more regionally distributed bond
portfolio than when they face impediments or country specific asymmetric information.
This is termed home bias. Borensztein and Loungani (2011) find that Asian investors
have a higher home bias than global investors, even after accounting for the effects of
exchange rate volatility. They also find that investors seem not to have an “Asia-specific”
preference for government debt, but invest globally instead.
Calvi (2010) compared the degree of integration in East Asia with the European
Union. The degree of financial integration in the EU has already been high in the past
but increased significantly after the introduction of the monetary union. This coincides
with the findings of Bhattacharyay (2011), indicating that exchange rate volatility plays
a significant negative role in the process of financial integration in the bond markets.
Overall, the state of integration in the East Asian bond markets seems to be weak.
East Asia appears less integrated than other regions, for example the CEE countries.
Asian investors in government debt also prefer to hold their domestic government debt
instead of spreading risks in order to smooth consumption. Although there seemed to
be an upward trend in financial integration before the AFC, this tendency has ceased.
As of today there is only minor empirical evidence, that integration in the government
bond market is increasing significantly. Instead of being integrated regionally, East Asia
is mostly integrated globally.
The major obstacle for regional investors in the East Asian bond market is that they
face many impediments that prevent them from having equal access to the regional
markets: Only few bonds are rated internationally; instead the majority is rated by
domestic rating agencies that do not have a common regional framework. Similarly,
East Asian countries all have their distinctive domestic regulatory frameworks, that
may even be based upon different traditions of law. This all increases the information
costs for international and regional investors and impedes equal market access. Some
countries in the region lack transparent institutions, which makes it even harder for
outside investors to properly assess the situation. Regional harmonization of national
rules and regulations or the harmonization into a common offshore market are possible
solutions to this problem (Black and Munro 2010; Scott 2007).
3.3.2. Financial Stability
There is even less research on the effects of foreign participation and financial integra-
tion in the East Asian bond markets on financial stability than on financial integration
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in general. Potential downsides of financial integration are the possibility of sudden
reversals of capital flows or increased volatility, due to foreign participation.
Empirical research by Johansson (2008) on the volatility of the East Asian bond
markets shows that volatility levels are unevenly distributed between the countries, but
volatility levels seem to be correlated and thus regional in nature. Similarly Peiris (2010)
finds that increased foreign participation in the LCY bond markets usually does not
lead to an increased volatility in bond-yields in emerging markets. But his findings also
indicate that volatility increased in Korea while it decreased in Malaysia with increased
participation12. Whether financial integration in the bond markets leads to volatility
and potential financial instability thus remains to be seen.
As was shown above, the experience of the GFC actually showed, that foreign partic-
ipation was a major factor in substituting bank finance with bond finance. When the
primary investor class in East Asian corporate bonds was curbing investment foreign
investors contributed liquidity and thus helped to prevent a credit squeeze in the region.
3.3.3. Regionalism in the East Asian Bond Market
In the East Asian region two initiatives developed that specifically aim to foster bond
market development and the establishment of a regional debt market. While the Asian
Bond Market Initiative targets supply-side issues the Asian Bond Fund targets the
demand-side.
The Asian Bond Market Initiative
The Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI), established by the 6th conference of the
ASEAN+3 finance ministers in August 2003 in Manila, targets supply side issues of
the bond market. It consists of six working groups, that conduct detailed studies on
market development and possible development strategies and works out proposals for
the establishment of market infrastructure: credit guarantee institutions, a clearing
and settlement-mechanism, rating-agency and the creation of new debt instruments.
The participation in these working groups is managed on a voluntary basis and usually
consists of members of ministries of the individual countries. (Park and Wyplosz 2010,
76)
12The reason behind this is suspected to be market characteristics and/or foreign investor specifics.
The fact that Malaysia has a special market for Islamic finance that is particularly attractive for
foreign investors and Islamic finance dismisses speculative trading could be a possible conclusion for
Malaysia.
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The activities of the ABMI focused at first at the generation of reports to resolve the
key issues impeding bond markets in East Asia, but progress was stagnant. In 2005 a
new road map was launched adding two new studies, one about the harmonization of
Asia’s regulatory framework in Asian Bond Standards, that would be similar to global
standards. And one about the issuance of bonds denominated in a basket of currencies
(in order to circumvent original sin). As actual progress continued to stagnate and
the working groups have been reorganized in 2006 a new road map was launched in
2008. This plan created four task forces that focused on the demand and supply of LCY
bonds and on the improvement of bond market regulation and infrastructure. (Park and
Wyplosz 2010, 77)
The task forces and working groups meet about every two months and consist of
mid-level bureaucrats and government officials, and officials from government agencies
(such as central banks, ministries of finance and so on). In between meetings these
participants stay in phone and email contact and carry out research at home. In the
long run this process results in proposals, guidelines and policy recommendations. But
the ABMI has no means or authority on it’s own to implement policies or to even initiate
research. Instead the pace is left to the individual participating countries and the ABMI
is supported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The only way to promote the
implementation of the developed guidelines and proposals is through a process of “self-
assessment”. These assessments are brief documents showing the progress since the last
semiannual meeting. Beside this kind of peer pressure no other instruments of fostering
the implementation exist for the ABMI (Grimes 2009, 177-179).
The ABMI also comprises of technical assistance, liquidity support and demonstration
projects. Again the ABMI has no means by itself. They are carried out by officials
of other ASEAN+3 governments or by institutions like the ADB. Grimes (2009, 180)
notes that “Japanese MOF officials have been particularly enthusiastic about providing
technical assistance and funding policy-relevant research under the auspices of ABMI.”
The actual results of the ABMI have been scarce compared to it’s long period of ex-
istence. As new achievements nearly stopped after some initial momentum, the pace
picked up again after the GFC. The most notable achievements consist of the implemen-
tation of the AsianBondsOnline website, the establishment of the Asian Bond Market
Forum, the implementation of a credit guarantee facility, and most recently the release
of a comprehensive ASEAN+3 Bond Market Guide.
To spread information about the ABMI the AsianBondsOnline website was launched
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in May 2004. This website is a vital organ and contains the most comprehensive easy-
to-use and free research and data on the East Asian bond markets. It also hosts the Asia
Bond Monitor, a free quarterly report on the most recent developments in the region’s
bond markets. As the ABMI itself does not have any infrastructure or means itself, the
website is run in cooperation with the ADB (ASEAN+3 2004).
As progress nearly came to a halt, pace picked up again in the wake of the GFC.
In September 2010 the ASEAN+3 Bond Market Forum (ABMF) was established “as
a common platform to foster standardization of market practices and harmonization
of regulations relating to cross-border bond transactions in the region” (ABMI 2010a).
The forum consists of quarterly meetings of ASEAN+3 officials, as well as interna-
tional experts, including international financial institutions such as Citibank, Deutsche
Bank, HSBC, J.P. Morgan and SWIFT (The Society for Worldwide Interbank Finan-
cial Telecommunication) (ADB 2012a, vi). In 2010 the first results of two task forces
were presented in the form of two reports. One report about the harmonization of bond
standards in ASEAN+3 (ABMI 2010c), and a feasibility study on the implementation
of a regional settlement intermediary (ABMI 2010b).
In November 2010 the Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility (CGIF) was estab-
lished with the aim to “promote financial stability and to boost long-term investment
in the ASEAN+3 region” (CGIF 2012). The CGIF is backed by a capital of USD 700
million, USD 570 million from the ASEAN+3 countries13 and USD 130 million from
the ADB. The facility allows ASEAN+3 issuers of investment-grade rating to apply for
a credit guarantee in return to the payment of a fee to the CGIF. In case of the non-
payment by the issuer the CGIF pledges to pay the bond holder for the remaining tenor
of the bond instead. The facility aims to make Asian bonds more attractive to prudent
institutional investors (such as pension funds) that invest only in the least-risky asset
classes. By providing a guarantee more bonds can become attractive for such investors.
The most recent achievement of the ABMI is the release of the ASEAN+3 Bond Market
Guide. The two volume guide, that has more than 1500 pages in total, summarizes the
regulatory and institutional differences in the ASEAN+3 markets and gives the most
comprehensive and in-depth overview yet. It aims to provide investors with the neces-
sary information to invest in these markets and it is also a baseline study for further
harmonization and standardization of bond market regulations across the region (ADB
13China and Japan both contributed 200 and Korea 100 million USD, the remaining 70 million were
committed by the ASEAN countries.
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2012a).
Critical Assessment Overall the success of the ABMI has to be assessed sceptically.
There have been only little to no concrete results. Instead several guides have been
published, all highlighting the importance of further steps to be taken, but collective
action has been scarce at best. A recent technical assistance report claimed that “[m]uch
has been achieved since the ABMI was launched. The volume of outstanding bonds
denominated in local currency in emerging East Asia has grown sharply from less than
$1.0 trillion at the end of 2001 to $5.2 trillion by the end of 2010.3” (ADB 2012b, 1).
While these numbers certainly are impressive, the role of the ABMI in the growth of
the bond markets is negligible. Mizen and Tsoukas (2010) estimated that the ABMI
had no significant effect on the probability of firms to issue bonds. Rather throughout
the different periods and samples firm-specific characteristics have been most impor-
tant. While government bond markets grew (which also comes at a certain cost) and a
yield-curve was established, corporate bond markets still are lacking behind. Also the
harmonization and standardization of the regulatory framework has not yet went further
than an initial stock-taking and some prepared proposals. As Keith Mullin, editor at
the International Financing Review notes that no institutional progress was made since
the establishment of the ABMI: “really nothing much has happened since then”. And
with the recent release of the monstrous ASEAN+3 Bond Market Guide, he rightfully
asks: “nine years on, all we get is a guide?”(IFR 2012) So even though the ABMI has
gathered renewed momentum recently, it’s actual results have been scarce. Bond mar-
kets have been developing more nationally than regionally and the establishment of a
regional market is still a long road ahead.
The Asian Bond Funds
While the ABMI targets the supply-side of bond market development, the Asian Bond
Funds (ABF) target demand-side issues. The Asian Bond Funds consists of two funds
that were established by the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks
and Monetary Authorities (EMEAP). EMEAP consists of the central banks of Aus-
tralia, China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. It thus represents the major participants of the
ASEAN+3 bond market initiative and Australia and New Zealand. The funds aim to
foster bond market development and liquidity by reinvesting a portion of the region’s
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foreign exchange reserves back into the region (BIS 2003).
The first fund (ABF 1) was established in June 2003. In this first step the EMEAP
countries invested USD 1 billion in dollar-denominated sovereign debt in the region, with
the exception of the markets of Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Then intention of
the fund is to provide governments with an incentive to issue benchmark debt, foster
private investment and the development of a yield-curve. Due to the low volume of the
fund and it’s buy-and-hold nature, there was little to no effect on liquidity in the dollar
denominated debt markets (Grimes 2009, 184-185).
The second bond fund (ABF 2) was launched in December 2004 and formally im-
plemented in July 2005. It aims to provide market access to investors and an easy
investment opportunity with low costs of management. It consists of a more sophisti-
cated structure than the ABF 1 and aims to target local currency denominated bonds in
the same countries as the ABF 1. It consists of 9 different funds: the Pan Asian Index
Fund (PAIF) is a passively managed fund that is traded in Hong Kong and Japan and is
thus open to investors all over the world. It is denominated in US-dollars and invests in
the eight countries’ local-currency bond markets. It is tracked as the “iBoxx Pan Asia
Index”. As the ABMI, EMEAP has no independent institutional means, the fund is
managed by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). The other eight single-market
funds are national local-currency bond funds that should gradually be established and
opened up to foreign investors. The half of the ABF 2’s initial capitalization of USD 2
billion is invested in the PAIF while the other half is distributed through the national
bond-funds (Ma 2005).
This intention to open up markets to investors outside the EMEAP countries is an
important aim of the ABF 2. The eight individual national bond funds and the PAIF
were thus designed to be open to international investors. While the PAIF was traded at
the Hong Kong exchange right after being launched, the establishment and liberalization
of the national bond funds (the so called phase two of the ABF 2) proceeded at a much
slower pace. Countries were encouraged to open their bond funds, but were able to
move at the pace of their desire. By 2008 only Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong had
opened their national bond funds (Johansson 2008, 103). But with renewed momentum
after the GFC the second phase of the ABF 2 was able to be completed in May of 2011,
with China being the last country to open it’s bond fund to foreign investors (EMEAP
2011).
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The Structure of the Asiand Bond Fund II
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Pan-Asian Bond
Index Fund (PAIF)
Underlying East Asian LCY Bonds
Single-
market
Fund
Single-
market
Fund
Single-
market
Fund
Single-
market
Fund
ABF 2
Source: Park and Wyplosz (2010) indicates funds open to public investment
Figure 3.11.: Structure of the Asian Bond Fund 2
Critical Assessment As the ABF 2 had the intention of providing an actractive trans-
parent and low-cost investment opportunity to foreign investors it’s size is an important
indicator of it’s success. Whereas the ABF 2 started out with USD 2 billion. It size
was roughly at USD 3 billion by the end of 2007 (Grimes 2009, 186) and climbed to
USD 4.2 billion by May 2011 (EMEAP 2011). Although this indicates that the ABF 2
was growing at about the same pace as East Asian bond markets in general the outside
investment in the fund is still at low levels and it is unlikely that it had a significant
impact on market liquidity (Grimes 2009, 186).
Apart from providing liquidity the ABF aimed at opening up markets. As with the
ABMI countries could proceed at their own speed in establishing and opening up their
national bond-funds. This second phase of the ABF took six years to complete. But
nevertheless this can be regarded as the biggest success of the ABF 2. As the EMEAP
countries were establishing their respective national funds they encountered several im-
pediments that often were removed afterwards. This learning-by-doing approach com-
bined with “peer encouragement” was able to reduce market impediments. For example
Thailand and Malaysia granted non-resident investors the exemption of withholding tax,
the Philippines removed the documentary stamp duty, Malaysia liberalized it’s foreign
exchange regime on the eve of launching ABF 2 and the ABF 2 was the first foreign
institutional investor in China that gained direct access to it’s inter-bank bond market
(Ma 2005, 29-30).
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3.4. Summary – The State of the Market
Bond market growth has been very diverse throughout the region. The rapid expansion
of government debt was primarily driven by the need of central banks to sterilize exces-
sive liquidity that resulted from a combination of capital inflows and the reluctance of
East Asian countries to appreciate their currencies. Potential sources of financial risks
are central banks balance sheet losses due to sterilization and excessive government debt
in Japan. Corporate bond market growth was more modest and along the line of eco-
nomic growth until 2009. No major change in the capital structure of East Asian firms
occurred as equity- and bank-finance remain the primary sources of capital. With banks
deleveraging, corporate bond market growth picked up and substituted the lack of bank
finance in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, acting as a spare tire. Overall
China, Japan and Korea account for over 90 % of the regional bond market.
Liquidity improved in the whole region but remains poor in both government- and
corporate bonds’ secondary-markets. The major obstacle is that markets are dominated
by investors that hold their securities until maturity. A diversification of the East Asian
investor base is the most pressing task. Regional investors do not manage to provide
such an extension in the investor base, as regional bond markets face only a small
degree of integration. The diverse institutional- and regulatory framework, as well as
high transaction- and settlement costs impede regional integration.
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4. Determinants of Bond Market
Growth
This chapter analyzes the endogenous determinants of government as well as corporate
bond market development econometrically. We start out by estimating the determinants
of bond market development in multivariate models similar to Bhattacharyay (2011) and
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2006). Some of the macroeconomic- and institu-
tional factors described in section 2.3 will be tested empirically in these models for the
East Asian region. After comparing our findings with the existing literature, we set out
to test the three hypothesis that were advanced in the previous chapter:
1. Developed government bond markets have positive effects on the development of
corporate bond markets.
2. Central banks’ sterilization efforts drive government bond market growth.
3. The corporate bond market took the role of a spare tire during the global financial
crisis.
The government- and corporate bond markets are dealt with separately. The first section
starts with the government-, the second with the corporate bond market, the third
summarizes the results.
4.1. Government Bond Market
A first look at the data indicates that the Japanese panel is a massive out-lier, having a
larger government bond market than any other East Asian country at any point in time.
We thus estimate all the following models including a dummy variable (Japan) for the
Japanese panel.
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4.1.1. Bhattacharyay’s Model
As a first step we estimate the model also used by Bhattacharyay (2011). When testing
for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation the null hypothesis of no serial correlation
and homoskedasticity has to be rejected at the 1 % level. The Pesaran test for cross-
sectional correlation also indicates cross-sectional dependence but only at the 5 % level.
Bhattacharyay (2011) found that only the size of the economy and the interest rate
spread were significant in the model accounting for heteroskedasticity. In the model
accounting for serial correlation no signficant relationships were being found. Table B.1
indicates our estimation results for the same model1.
As we found heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional- and serial correlation we estimate our
model taking these properties into account2. Table 4.1, column 1 shows the estimation
results. In contrast to all other models the size of the economy becomes insignificant
when adding the serial-correlation-correcting term. The potential reason for this is a
spurious regression between size of the economy and the government bond market, as
both variables have a clear upward trend. Openness and interest rate spread are both
significant but have an unexpected sign, openness being negatively and the interest rate
spread being positively related to bond market size. The size of the banking system
has the expected sign and is highly significant. Exchange rate stability is significant in
all models but our model that is taking all three statistical problems into account, but
the sign is negative, indicating a negative relationship between exchange rate stability
instead of the expected positive one. The Japanese dummy-variable is highly significant
in all estimated models.
When comparing the results of the estimation with the results by Bhattacharyay
(2011), we find that variables in our estimation are more likely to be significant, but
do in many cases not coincide with what was expected from theory. For Bhattacharyay
the size of the economy was significant in one out of three regressions, similarly we find
it to be significant and positive when not including an autocorrelated error-term (see
table B.1 in the appendix). As noted above this relationship could also be the result of
spurious regression rather than a genuine relationship. The stage of development and
the size of the banking system is also positive and significant. These findings are in
line with our theoretical assumptions. Instead of being positively related, openness and
1The specification difference in Bhattacharyay (2011) and our model is that here another variable for
exchange rate stability and the additional Japan-dummy variable is being used.
2Estimations with OLS, GLS without cross-sectional- and without serial correlation can be found in
the Appendix.
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exchange rate stability is negatively related to bond market development. Similarly a
higher interest rate spread is also having a positive, instead of the expected negative
effect.
4.1.2. Adding Institutional Factors
After estimating Bhattacharyay’s model, that consists mainly of macroeconomic factors,
in a next step we add several institutional factors. At first we estimate these factors
separately. Tests indicate serial correlation and heteroskedasticity at the 1 % level, but
no cross-sectional correlation. Column 2 of Table 4.1 shows the results of the regression.
Corruption and regulatory oversight have the expected significant positive effect on
government bond market development. Interestingly the indicator of a government’s rule
of law is highly significant but has a negative sign. This would imply that governments
with weaker rule of law have bigger government bond markets. Another interesting
finding is that countries with a defined-contribution pension systems have smaller gov-
ernment debt markets than countries with a defined-benefit system. The influence of
high government commitment to foster bond market growth is highly significant and
positive related to market development. Bank concentration is the only variable that
clearly is not significant.
As a next step the combined model of macroeconomic and institutional factors is being
estimated. Again the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independent error terms can not
be rejected. And the test for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity is statistically
significant at the 1 % level. Column 3 of Table 4.1 gives the estimated coefficients of
the combined model.
All the results from the separate estimation of the new components stay significant
and no sign-switching occurs in the combined estimation. Bank concentration is still
insignificant. With regard to the macroeconomic factors from the first estimated model,
a few changes occur. GDP per capita, an indicator of economic development, becomes
insignificant. Openness becomes less significant and switches it’s sign to the expected
positive relationship. Exchange rate variability becomes significant at the 5 % level, but
asserts a negative effect on bond market development. The size of the banking systems
remains to be a highly signficant positive determinant of bond market size.
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Table 4.1.: Determinants of the Government Bond Market
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES gov bond gdp gov bond gdp gov bond gdp
gdp ppp -0.0111 1.995
(0.686) (1.542)
gdp capita ppp 11.89*** 4.955
(0.640) (4.243)
openness -0.0669*** 0.0514**
(0.00568) (0.0215)
i spread 0.371*** 2.857***
(0.143) (0.679)
bank credit 0.196*** 0.168***
(0.0122) (0.0336)
xr stability -0.326 -7.832**
(0.983) (3.492)
japan 42.56*** 121.5*** 108.0***
(3.059) (24.85) (15.28)
corruption -6.138** -12.92***
(3.046) (3.721)
law -11.44*** -26.65***
(4.172) (4.761)
regulatory 15.76*** 22.96***
(4.461) (5.277)
bank concentration -4.447 7.317
(4.767) (5.901)
pension dc -8.829** -13.01***
(3.459) (2.304)
gov commit 27.62*** 37.11***
(3.393) (2.993)
Constant -88.23*** 27.38*** -110.0***
(18.56) (4.129) (34.45)
Observations 100 80 80
Panels (countries) 10 10 10
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) GLS-estimator with panel-specific AR1 and cross-sectional dependent errors
(2) & (3) GLS-estimator with panel-specific AR1 and heteroskedastic errors
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4.1.3. Hypothesis 2 — Sterilization
As a final step we add the variable indicating sterilization efforts of central banks to
the three estimations of Table 4.1. The results are shown in Table 4.2. The variable for
sterilization is based on Aizenman and Glick (2009), who use it to estimate a sterilization
coefficient for three East Asian countries, and indicates the relationship of domestic
credit and foreign reserve inflows. It is calculated as:
Sterilization =
ReserveMoney − ForeignAssets
ReserveMoney
The numerator of the fraction is also called net domestic credit assets. As national
currencies vary through different countries it is denominated by the domestic monetary
base. “Positive values of net foreign reserve accumulation by the central bank correspond
to foreign reserve inflows. Negative values of net domestic credit correspond to reductions
in domestic assets held by the monetary authorities” (Aizenman and Glick 2009, 780).
These reductions aim to sterilize the purchase of foreign exchange reserves. As was
shown above this can be achieved by issuing central bank bills, increasing bank reserve
requirements or selling government bonds. When using the variable in the regression
we expect the sign to be negative, as central banks reduce their domestic assets when
sterilizing foreign exchange reserves (negative sign of variable) which should have a
positive influence on the development of the government bond market. Put another
way: the higher the amount of sterilized foreign assets in an economy the lower is the
sterilization coefficient as the monetary base is being reduced by the central bank. The
coefficient is negative in most East Asian countries, so to exert a positive effect on bond
market development the sign of the variable has to be negative 3.
Table 4.2 depicts the three models with the added sterilization variables. The ster-
ilization variable is highly significant and with the expected positive influence on bond
market development in all three specifications. It is thus convincing to conclude that
sterilization efforts of East Asian central banks are a major determinant of government
bond market growth.
While no changes occur in sign and significance-level for the institutional factors in the
final specification. The macroeconomic determinants experience some changes. While
the size of the economy was insignificant in the former model specifications it becomes
3As (RM − FA)/RM is equal to 1− FA/RM the usage of the level of foreign assets with respect to
the monetary base would come to the same results in the regression, but with inverted signs (and
of course a shifted intercept).
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significant after sterilization was added. Openness, that had an odd negative influence
on bond market development, now exerts a positive influence, but is only slightly in-
significant. The interest rate spread still has a positive effect, but did become nearly
statistically insignificant. Exchange rate stability also did become insignificant in the
final model.
4.1.4. Discussion and Economic Interpretation
The results of the regressions confirms that most of the expected determinants exert an
influence on government bond market growth. The majority of our results are in line
with Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2006) and Bhattacharyay (2011). It is found
that the size of the economy, the size of the banking system, corruption, the quality
of the regulatory framework and the outspoken government commitment are important
determinants of government bond market development. The openness of an economy
exerted only little influence in our East Asian samples. Exchange rate stability also
seemed insignificant in our final specification.
The most controversial findings, that are not in line with our theoretical expectations,
are the negative impact of defined-contribution pension-systems and stronger rule of
law. We expected both variables to be positively related with bond market develop-
ment. A possible explanation is that governments that have a stronger rule of law and
more sustainable pension-systems4 also have more sustainable public finances and exert
less influence on their exchange rates. In this case the effect of these variables on the
government bond market would be negative. The positive effect of these variables would
nevertheless persist in the corporate bond market.
The fact that institutional factors were robust through-out all changes in model spec-
ifications may hint that institutional factors have a more important influence on bond
market growth than plain macroeconomic factors. As these influences may also be a
proxy for the omitted variable of government-debt and fiscal policy, a highly significant
influence on the corporate bond market would be needed to back this interpretation.
The high significance and the expected negative sign of the sterilization variable leads
to the conclusion that our second hypothesis can be accepted: Sterilization efforts of the
foreign reserve build-up by East Asian central banks is a major driving force in the East
4Assuming that defined-benefits pension systems are more prone to reform due to time-inconsistency
problems of policy-makers.
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Table 4.2.: Sterilization and the Government Bond Market
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES gov bond gdp gov bond gdp gov bond gdp
gdp ppp 11.02*** 4.388***
(2.084) (1.282)
gdp capita ppp -12.81*** -4.021
(3.470) (3.582)
openness 0.0545*** 0.0279*
(0.0150) (0.0151)
i spread 0.262 1.135*
(0.210) (0.600)
bank credit 0.138*** 0.111***
(0.0472) (0.0304)
xr stability -3.813** -3.214
(1.655) (3.138)
sterilization -6.685*** -4.624*** -4.625***
(0.577) (0.665) (0.713)
japan 75.47*** 129.9*** 117.8***
(7.667) (10.58) (12.03)
corruption -10.84*** -13.54***
(2.518) (3.074)
law -13.87*** -19.39***
(2.708) (3.553)
regulatory 17.95*** 25.41***
(3.201) (4.333)
bank concentration -9.214** -3.413
(3.725) (5.306)
pension dc -11.29*** -8.931***
(2.412) (2.137)
gov commit 15.09*** 23.05***
(3.340) (2.995)
Constant -190.5*** 25.14*** -83.42***
(46.73) (2.853) (26.01)
Observations 80 70 70
Panels (countries) 10 10 10
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) GLS-estimator with panel-specific AR1 and cross-sectional dependent errors
(2) & (3) GLS-estimator with panel-specific AR1 and heteroskedastic errors
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Asian government bond market.
4.2. Corporate Bond Market
After analyzing the determinants of government bond market growth this section esti-
mates the effect of macroeconomic and institutional factors on the East Asian corporate
bond market.
4.2.1. Bhattacharyay’s Model
We start again by estimating the model used by Bhattacharyay (2011). When testing
for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation we can reject the null hypothesis of no serial
correlation at the 2 % and homoskedasticity at the 1 % level. The Pesaran test for
cross-sectional correlation also indicates cross-sectional dependence at the 1 % level.
Taking these into account we estimate the model with cross-sectional correlation and
an added AR(1) term. As with the government bond market, the regressions that use
OLS or account solely for heteroskedasticity or cross-panel correlation can be found in
the apendix (tables B.4 - B.6).
Bhattacharyay found that the size of the economy, the stage of economic development
and economic openness have a positive influence on bond market development. Inter-
est rate spread had the expected negative influence. Exchange rate stability had an
unexpected negative sign, as did bank credit.
In our model specification we find the stage of economic development to be a significant
positive factor, but except for this we have different findings. The size of the economy and
its openness is significant and negatively related to corporate bond market development
in our estimation, this is not expected and also contrary to the findings of Eichengreen
and Luengnaruemitchai (2006). The size of the banking system together with exchange
rate stability is positively associated with the size of the corporate bond market as is
expected from economic theory. The interest rate spread has no significant influence.
All other significant variables were significant at the 1 % level.
4.2.2. Adding Institutional Factors
As a next step we add institutional factors. Again we estimate them separately in a
first step and combine macroeconomic and institutional factors together in a separate
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model afterwards. We start out testing the separate model of institutional factors and
find cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity at the 1 % and serial correlation
at the 2 % level. Column 2 in table 4.3 shows the results of the regression.
We find the rule of law, the regulatory framework and the dummy variable for out-
spoken government commitment to be highly significant at the 1 % level and with the
expected sign. Bank concentration exerts a very weak positive influence at the 10 % level
that is oposite to the expectation of entrenched interest groups. The variables capturing
corruption and the type of pension system are insignificant.
In the next step the macroeconomic and institutional factors are being combined into
the full model. Per capita GDP as a measure of economic development, the interest rate
spread and exchange rate stability an the dummy of outspoken government commitment
are all significantly related to corporate debt market development at the 1 % level and
with the expected sign. Bank credit is, as anticipated, positively associated but only at
the 10 % level. Corruption is as expected negatively related but significant only at the
5 % level. These findings are all in line with the theory depicted above. The size of the
economy and the quality of the regulatory framework is negatively related to corporate
bond market development, which is contrary to what was expected from theory.
In contrast to the findings of the government bond market the revealed picture is not as
clear and several reversals of signs did occur when combining the two different separate
models. Additionally some variables loose their significance in the full model. This
indicates that the influence of the determinants may not be as clear and robust as the
results of the government bond market. As can be seen in Table B.5 the introduction of
the autoregressive term to overcome serial correlation makes the coefficient for corruption
insignificant and causes a switching of signs of the bank concentration coefficient for
the separate model. Similarly openness, the rule of law and the type of pension system
become insignificant and bank credit nearly insignificant positive in the full model (Table
B.6).
Nearly all varying results occur after the autoregressive error-term in order to deal
with serial correlation was added. In this process the regression loses degrees of freedom
in two different ways: by adding a new coefficient for each panel and by the loss of an
observation in each panel due to the panel-specific auto-regression term. With already
14 coefficients in the regression prior to this procedure, we are left with only 57 degrees of
freedom after the inclusion of the term. Although theoretically sufficient, the coefficients
are very prone to be over-fitted. The sudden reversal of signs or change in a coefficient’s
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significance hint that this may be the case in this specification. In order to deal with serial
correlation in other ways it was also tested to introduce a lagged dependent variable.
But this led to even more insignificant results. As the data is highly autocorrelated the
lagged variable is likely to cause the other explanatory variables to be underestimated
(Keele and Kelly 2006).
The coefficients of the pension system, rule of law and openness are significant in all
other three specifications but the last estimation. Similarly is bank credit negative in all
three estimations (but highly significant in only two), while reversed signs only in the
autoregressive estimation. While the interest rate spread is negative but insignificant it
suddenly becomes highly significant after the massive loss in degrees of freedom. Likewise
did the regulatory system exert no influence in any but the last regression. From a
statistical point of view this casts the results of the autoregressive estimation for the
corporate bond market into doubt. Similarly to Bhattacharyay (2011) the interpretation
of the results is thus based on all estimations of the full model, but the statistical
problems of either serial-correlation or a very small degree of freedom have to be kept
in mind.
4.2.3. Hypothesis 1 — Spill over Effects of the government bond
market
As a next step the two hypothesis advanced in the previous chapter will be tested.
We start out with the first hypothesis that an advanced government bond market has
positive externalities on the corporate bond market. This hypothesis is tested by adding
the variable that depicts the size of the government bond market. To have positive
externalities we expect it to have a positive sign. Table 4.4 shows the results of the
estimation.
The government bond market seems not to have any positive externalities. Instead in
all three equations the sign of the coefficient is negative but statistically significant in
only two estimations. To test for robustness a lagged government bond market variable
was included in the equation and, because Japan is a massive outlier in government debt,
the Japanese dummy was added. Additionally we conducted the estimations without
the auto-regressive term as it reduces the degrees of freedom massively. Regardless of
the changes, the estimations (not listed) came to the same results: A larger government
bond market did never have a significant positive effect on the corporate bond market,
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but had an insignificant or negative influence in all cases. We thus can convincingly
reject the proposed hypothesis. Instead a 1 % increase in government debt decreased
the size of the corporate bond market by 0.1 to 0.2 percent. The economic discussion
will follow after the test of the last hypothesis.
4.2.4. Hypothesis 3 — A spare tire?
The third hypothesis suggests that the corporate bond market acted as a spare tire during
the global financial crisis. As East Asian banks followed their western counterparts and
deleveraged, firms increasingly turned towards the bond market. And the high yield in
the East Asian region attracted foreign investors that could meet the demand for funds.
In order to test for this hypothesis a dummy variable is added that takes the value of
one for the period starting with 2008. Table 4.5 shows the results of the estimation. In
all three estimations the dummy variable is significant and with the expected positive
sign. Corrected for other institutional or macroeconomic factors, the corporate bond
market grew by about 2 to 2.4 % of GDP in the period after the global financial crisis.
Note that this regression was conducted without the panel specific auto-regressive term
in the equation. The results of the estimation with the lagged dependent variable can be
found in the appendix (Table B.7). As with the model that combined macroeconomic and
institutional factors, the introduction of the auto-regressive term leads to contradicting
results. Out of three estimations one coefficient is positive significant, one negative
significant and another insignificant. The problems of over-fitting due to a loss in degrees
of freedom was described above. Additionally the autoregressive term may be reducing
the influence of the shock variable, as the shock feeds into the second period after the first
appearance due to the lagged error term. This would overestimate the autoregressive
coefficient and underestimate the effect of the dummy variable. To fully capture the
effect of the period after the global financial crisis the regression was estimated without
the auto-regressive term. Nevertheless the possible problems due to serial-correlation of
the error terms have to be kept in mind.
Although the results of the regression were convincing that the corporate bond market
increased specifically in the period of the global financial crisis, we still have to be
careful when accepting the proposed hypothesis. The added autoregressive term led to
contradictory results and showed that the results may not be very robust. Despite our
results suggesting that the corporate bond market took the role of a spare tire, still more
research is necessary to find more robust estimates.
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Table 4.3.: Determinants of the Corporate Bond Market
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES corp bond gdp corp bond gdp corp bond gdp
gdp ppp -2.742*** -2.237***
(0.0607) (0.358)
gdp capita ppp 12.44*** 12.49***
(0.212) (1.068)
openness -0.0304*** 0.00135
(0.00131) (0.00652)
i spread 0.00425 -0.362***
(0.0192) (0.0926)
bank credit 0.0307*** 0.0158*
(0.00112) (0.00940)
xr stability 1.840*** 2.935***
(0.118) (0.701)
corruption -0.466 -2.457**
(0.661) (1.051)
law 7.954*** 0.0820
(0.433) (0.999)
regulatory 4.844*** -2.440**
(0.537) (1.225)
bank concentration 1.702* 1.401
(0.978) (1.186)
pension dc 2.871 1.570
(2.871) (1.344)
gov commit 19.78*** 16.26***
(3.336) (1.312)
Constant -23.99*** 6.115*** -42.59***
(1.892) (0.714) (10.02)
Observations 110 80 80
Panels (countries) 10 10 10
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1), (2) and (3) GLS-estimator with panel-specific AR1 and cross-sectional dependent errors
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Table 4.4.: Testing Hypothesis 1: Externalities of the Government Bond Market?
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES corp bond gdp corp bond gdp corp bond gdp
gdp ppp -2.415*** -1.622**
(0.141) (0.691)
gdp capita ppp 12.33*** 14.04***
(0.355) (1.201)
openness -0.0261*** -0.0181
(0.00314) (0.0135)
i spread 0.153*** -0.281
(0.0562) (0.257)
bank credit 0.0426*** 0.0898***
(0.00261) (0.0159)
xr stability 0.315 0.897
(0.313) (1.529)
gov bond gdp -0.105*** -0.00372 -0.201***
(0.0124) (0.0146) (0.0305)
corruption 0.397 -4.600**
(0.615) (1.860)
law 5.310*** -1.256
(0.628) (1.972)
regulatory 6.489*** 2.457
(0.832) (1.878)
bank concentration -0.667 -0.112
(1.251) (2.376)
pension dc 8.677*** 4.859**
(1.999) (2.091)
gov commit 10.42*** 16.69***
(2.172) (1.475)
Constant -30.21*** 6.365*** -72.89***
(3.883) (1.315) (15.78)
Observations 110 80 80
Panels (countries) 10 10 10
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1), (2) and (3) GLS-estimator with cross-sectional dependent errors
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4.2.5. Discussion and Economic Interpretation
The results of the regressions for the corporate bond market are not as easily inter-
pretable as the results of the government bond market. When relying solely on the OLS-
or the GLS-estimator without specifically accounting for serial correlation we come to
clearer results than when introducing either a lagged dependent variable or an autore-
gressive term. As the estimation that accounts for serial correlation is also more prone to
be over fitted due to the loss of an entire period and the introduction of new coefficients
it is ambiguous which regression to prefer.
When comparing the two different results, the following results seem to be robust:
In line with Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2006) it is found that the stage of
economic development, the interest rate spread, exchange rate stability and the level
of corruption are major determinants of corporate bond market development. We also
find, similarly to Dickie and Fan (2005), that outspoken government commitment seems
to be an important factor. We find no significant influence of bank concentration on the
development of the corporate debt market in East Asia.
Contrary to expectations the size of the government bond market seems not to be
positively related to the size of the corporate bond market. This means that the proposed
hypothesis of positive spill-over effects of the government bond market has to be rejected
for East Asia. Instead there seem to be negative externalities. A possible economic
interpretation is that government debt may crowd out private borrowers. McCauley
and Remolona (2000, 56) state regarding the government bond market: “It is important
to realise that bigger is not always better. In the case where the supply of government
debt is determined by deficits, any benefits from the government bond as a pricing
benchmark and hedging instrument can be lost if the government crowds out private
borrowing”. Governments with higher debt may also resort to financial repression more
easily, impeding the development of a corporate bond market.
Another contradictory but robust finding arises with the economy’s size. While Bhat-
tacharyay (2011) and Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2006) find that the size of
the economy is an important factor, we have to conclude that the size of the economy
is negatively related to corporate bond market development in East Asia.
There are several ambiguous results due to contradictory outcomes from the regression
that includes the autoregressive term. Any conclusion from these results has to be made
very cautiously as they come from a regression with serial correlation in the error terms
and were vindicated by an estimation with a very small sample size but with a large
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Table 4.5.: Testing Hypothesis 3: GFC as a determinant of the Corporate Bond Market?
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES corp bond gdp corp bond gdp corp bond gdp
gdp ppp -4.911*** -1.835***
(0.345) (0.583)
gdp capita ppp 22.03*** 13.77***
(0.398) (1.453)
openness -0.0940*** -0.0520***
(0.00510) (0.0102)
i spread -2.604*** -0.621***
(0.121) (0.240)
bank credit -0.122*** -0.0694***
(0.00206) (0.0136)
xr stability 17.92*** 11.70***
(0.900) (2.129)
gfc 2.023*** 2.449*** 2.423**
(0.332) (0.921) (0.986)
corruption -15.20*** -8.732***
(1.875) (2.250)
law 18.24*** 8.583***
(1.131) (2.309)
regulatory 11.31*** 4.485*
(1.552) (2.531)
bank concentration -9.771*** -10.85***
(1.610) (2.207)
pension dc 4.120*** 4.674***
(0.948) (1.144)
gov commit 15.11*** 7.842***
(0.967) (1.863)
Constant -22.30** 9.964*** -46.99***
(8.674) (1.333) (14.11)
Observations 110 90 90
Panels (countries) 10 10 10
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1), (2) & (3) GLS-estimator with cross-sectional dependent errors
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number of coefficients:
It is found that bank credit has a negative influence on corporate debt market de-
velopment. Despite theory expecting and Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2006)
finding an opposite effect, this could mean that the corporate bond market takes the role
of a substitute rather than a complement in East Asia. The experiences of the global
financial crisis support this view.
Contrary to theory and to Bhattacharyay (2011) it is found that openness seems
negatively related to the corporate bond market.
Surprisingly the regulatory framework is most likely not exerting a positive influence.
While the variable’s coefficient is insignificant in most of the regression it even has a
negative influence in the AR-regression. But, in line with economic theory, the rule of
law and a defined-contribution pension system have a positive effect on the corporate
bond market.
The third hypothesis, that the corporate bond market took the role of a spare tire
can be cautiously accepted. It was found that the size of the corporate bond market
increased by about 2 to 2.4 % in the period after the global financial crisis.
4.3. Summary of Results
This chapter examined the determinants of bond market development in the East Asian
region. A similar approach to Bhattacharyay (2011) was taken, but additional institu-
tional variables considered as potential factors in East Asian bond market development.
Additionally three hypothesis were tested that were introduced in the analysis of the
current state of the market. While many theoretical expectations were confirmed by the
multivariate analysis, several contradictory results emerged. Some determinants seem to
particularly have different effects on the government- or corporate bond market. Table
4.6 gives an overview of expectations from theory and empirical findings in both markets.
Size of the Economy The size of the economy was anticipated to have a positive
influence on the level of bond market development in East Asia due to a more easily
achieved effective scale. We could only validate this theory for the government bond
market. In the corporate bond market smaller economies seem to have bigger corporate
bond markets.
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Developmental stage of the economy A more developed economy (measured as GDP
per capita) was expected to have a positive influence on bond market development. This
theory could only be confirmed for the corporate bond market. The variable became
insignificant for the government bond market when institutional variables, such as the
rule of law and corruption were added. As more developed countries tend to have
better institutions supporting their economy this result does not conflict with theory.
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2006) came to the same finding.
Exchange Rate Stability A more stable exchange rate was assumed to attract foreign
investors and thus spur bond market development. Again this was only found to be a
significant factor for the corporate bond market. The government bond market was not
affected by more stable exchange rates. This could indicate more appetite of foreign
investors in corporate- rather than East Asian sovereign bonds.
Interest Rate Spread As high interest rate spreads make long-term investments such
as bonds less attractive, they are negatively associated with bond market development.
This was found to be the case for the corporate bond market. The government bond
market was, contrary to theory, positively related to the interest rate spread.
Pension System The type of pension system a country employs is also expected to
have an impact on the bond market, as defined contribution schemes systems tend to
build up assets and defined benefits pension plans are often financed with a pay-as-
you-go method. Again we find different results for the corporate or the government
bond market. A positive relationship with the corporate debt market is found, but
this relationship seems not to be very robust. The government bond market tends to be
smaller in countries with a DCS pension system. A possible explanation is that countries
with more sustainable pension system also may have stricter fiscal policies or less need
to cross-finance a pay-as-you-go DBS scheme.
Bond- and Bank Debt — Complementary or Substitute? Whether bank and bond
market debt constitute a complement or a substitute has not been fully determined in
theory yet. While entrenched interests of banks could impede bond market development
banks could as well benefit from securitization and fee-based investment banking. Two
variables were included to test these theories for the East Asian region. Bank concen-
tration is expected to indicate the influence and power of the banking system. The
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entrenched interests of a concentrated banking system is associated to be negatively
related to bond market development. Contrary to the findings of Dickie and Fan (2005)
no signficiant relationship was found in either market.
The second variable is the size of the banking system. As banks benefit from similar
institutions as bond markets and also can benefit from a developed debt market a positive
relationship is expected. But again entrenched interests could also imply a negative
relationship as a bigger, more powerful banking system may constrain the development
of the bond market. While a weak negative effect of amount of bank credit on the
corporate bond market, a positive influence on the government bond market is found.
Rule of Law, Corruption and the Regulatory Framework Rigidly enforced contracts,
low levels of corruption and a strong regulatory framework are expected to provide the
basis for the development of a functioning bond market. In line with this theory we find
a negative effect of corruption on both markets. A more advanced regulatory framework
had similarly positive effects on the government market, but no significant relationship
with the corporate debt market could be found. A stronger enforcing of contracts and
rule of law had a weakly positive relationship with the corporate but a negative effect on
the government bond market. A possible explanation of this result is that countries with
stronger rule of law might also have stricter fiscal policies, leading to less government
debt.
Government Commitment Dickie and Fan (2005) found that the outspoken commit-
ment of governments to rapidly develop their domestic bond markets is an important
factor. Similarly we found the dummy variable to have the expected positive effect in
both markets.
Hypothesis I: Externalities of the Government Bond Market The first hypothesis
proposed suggested that a developed government bond market would provide external-
ities to the economy and also foster the development of a corporate bond market, for
example by providing a benchmark yield curve. To test this hypothesis the size of the
government bond market was added in the multivariate analysis of the corporate mar-
ket. The results showed that East Asian countries with larger government bond markets
had smaller corporate bond markets. A 1 % increase in government debt decreased
the size of the corporate bond market by 0.1 to 0.2 percent. A possible explanation is
that government debt might crowd out private debt or that governments with higher
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government debt may also impede bond market development by more easily resorting
to financial repression.
Hypothesis II: Monetary Sterilization The second hypothesis suggested that the
growth of government debt in the region was heavily driven by the sterilization efforts
of East Asian central banks. The assumption was tested by including the net domestic
credit assets scaled by the reserve money of each economy. The variable is based upon
the estimations of a sterilization coefficient by Aizenman and Glick (2009). It was found
that sterilization is a highly significant driving force of government bond market growth
in the East Asian region.
Hypothesis III: The Global Financial Crisis The third hypothesis advanced that the
East Asian corporate bond market took the role of a spare tire during the period of the
global financial crisis. To test the thesis a dummy was included in the regression for
the period of the global financial crisis. The variable was highly significant and suggests
that the bond market grew about 2 to 2.4 % of GDP specifically due to the effects of
the crisis.
Table 4.6.: Overview of Empirical Determinants of East Asian Bond Markets
Theory Government Corporate
Bank Credit + / - + - (ambig)
Exchange Rate Stability + insig +
GDP per capita + insig +
Interest Rate Spread - + -
Openness + + - (ambig)
Size of the Economy + + -
Bank Concentration - insig insig
Corruption - - -
DC Pension System + - + (ambig)
Government Commitment + + +
Regulatory Framework + + insig (ambig)
Rule of Law + - + (ambig)
GFC-Dummy + +
Government Bond Market + -
Sterilization + +
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5. Conclusion
This thesis started out analyzing the current state of the government- and corporate bond
markets in terms of size, liquidity, the role that markets play in the economy, as well as
their integration and regionalism. It then proceeded to use an empirical model to analyze
panel-data to find the major endogenous driving forces of bond market development in
the region. The questions answered are:
• What are the potentials of developing and integrating domestic bond markets?
• What is the state of development and integration in the East Asian bond markets
(government and corporate)?
• What are the determinants of bond market growth in East Asia? How can the
uneven speed and progress in the regional development of the East Asian bond
markets be explained?
5.1. Government Bond Market
Potentials of Bond Market Development
An overview of the potentials of the development of the government bond market in
academic literature showed that:
• The government bond market is the most versatile and least disturbing form of
government finance. As it is a market-based form of finance, it exerts the least
disturbances on the capital market as long as rates are truly determined by markets
and market-participants are not forced to hold government securities. (See 2.2.1.1)
• With an established government bond market, monetary authorities have addi-
tional and less costly tools at their hand to control liquidity in the financial sector.
(See 2.2.1.1)
99
• With sufficient government benchmark securities and liquidity in the market, a
yield curve is established that provides additional information for investors and
has positive effects on the economy. (See 2.2.1.2)
• Government finance through bond markets is not as prone to cause inflation and
thus increase financial stability, but developing countries may still find it hard to
finance themselves in their own currency, which might expose them to a currency
mismatch and hence foster financial instability. (See 2.2.1.3)
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 was the crucial event that started to accelerate national
and regional efforts to establish a developed government bond market.
State of the Market
Since then the bond markets in the East Asian region grew rapidly. While the govern-
ment bond market was virtually non-existent in some countries, it became the major
source of finance for all countries in the region. Markets’ liquidity also improved through-
out the region during the last decade. Despite these fast developments, large differences
between the region’s markets remain. While in 2010 Japan had government bonds out-
standing worth 168 % of GDP the size of Vietnam’s market accounted only for a little
over 13 %. Liquidity varies similarly: the bid-ask-spread is nearly 50 times larger in
Vietnam than in Korea. (See 3.1.1)
Monetary Policy With established government bond markets, monetary authorities in
the region were able to use the market to steer liquidity in the financial system. Except
for China, all countries primarily use market-based instruments to conduct monetary
policy. The massive build-up in foreign exchange reserves in the region also led to
superfluous liquidity in the financial system that was successfully sterilized by issuing
central bank bonds (China used bank’s reserve requirements). These sterilization efforts
massively drove the rapid growth in the government bond market (See 3.1.3). This
hypothesis was also confirmed by the empirical estimations (See 4.1.3).
Yield Curve Development All countries in the region managed to establish a yield
curve by issuing bonds in major benchmark-maturities. But differences remain, espe-
cially due to missing liquidity in some maturities. This can result in sudden spikes in
the yield curve and limits the information-content for investors (See 3.1.2). Economic
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theory suggests that the establishment of a yield curve could have spill-over effects on
the economy and on the corporate bond market. The results of the estimation showed
that there might be no such effect on the East Asian corporate bond market. (See 4.2.3)
Financial Stability Overall, the establishment of government bond markets seems to
have contributed to financial stability. While only Japan faces the risk of large amounts
of government debt, debt burdens remain low in the rest of East Asia. The problem
of original sin might persist but has been rapidly dampened by the establishment of
the local currency bond markets. The only risks on financial stability might be the
costs that central banks face due to the need to sterilize excess liquidity, caused by the
build-up of foreign exchange reserve; and the fact that in the long run foreign exchange
accumulation is incompatible with capital mobility and sovereign monetary policy, which
could dampen government bond market growth. (See 3.1.4)
5.1.1. Determinants of Government Bond Market Growth
An empirical model was used to analyze panel-data to find which endogenous deter-
minants had significant impact on the development in the East Asian bond markets.
Several possible determinants were tested. It was found that the size of the economy,
the size of the banking system, corruption, the quality of the regulatory framework
and the outspoken government commitment are important determinants of government
bond market development. The openness of an economy exerted only little influence
and exchange rate stability also seemed insignificant in our final specification (See 4.1).
Additionally, the hypothesis was tested that sterilization efforts of monetary authorities
contributed to bond market growth. The sterilization indicator was found to be highly
significant in all model specifications, backing the hypothesis. (See 4.1.3)
5.2. Corporate Bond Market
Similar to the government bond market, it was found that the development of the cor-
porate bond market has positive effects on the economy. It was found that:
• A corporate bond market allows capital to be distributed within the economy
more efficiently. Safe and established firms are able to finance themselves less
costly through the bond markets. This allows banks to put capital to use more
efficiently. (See 2.2.2.1)
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• Bond finance also allows banks and corporations to borrow long-term and in any
currency. By this, potential currency- and maturity mismatches in the region are
mitigated and financial stability is fostered. The bond market could also play the
role of a spare-tire in case banks are reducing lending. (See 2.2.2.2)
As with the government bond market, the Asian financial crisis revealed the costs
of not having a developed bond market and marked a turning point in the efforts to
develop the local bond markets.
5.2.1. State of the Market
While corporate bond markets developed fast in East Asia, they grew more modestly
than their government counterparts. Again the development is very diverse throughout
the region. The markets in China, Korea and Thailand grew most rapidly, stagnated in
Indonesia and even declined in Japan. A major obstacle in the whole region is insufficient
liquidity. Bid-ask-spreads are low in Korea and China and very high in Indonesia and
Vietnam. Liquidity and trading is mostly limited to the primary markets. This seems
to be the result of an investor base that is dominated by buyers who hold securities until
maturity. (See 3.2.1)
Financial Intermediation While the corporate bond markets grew and developed in
the region, the growth was still far more modest than that of government bond markets.
As other forms of finance also grew steadily, the banking system remained the major form
of finance in the region. The capital structure did not change significantly throughout
the region. (See 3.2.2)
Spare Tire Theory In the decade after the Asian financial crisis, it remained unclear
whether the East Asian corporate bond market could play the role of a spare tire. The
global financial crisis led to a deleveraging in the East Asian banking system. In turn,
the corporate bond market picked up, playing the role of a substitute (See 3.2.3). This
experience was as well tested empirically and could be confirmed within certain limits.
It was found that the corporate bond market grew in average 2 to 2.4 % due to the
global financial crisis. (See 4.2.4)
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5.2.2. Determinants of Corporate Bond Market Growth
The results of the empirical analysis of corporate bond market determinants came to
more ambiguous results than the assessment of the government bond market. Robust
determinants are the stage of economic development, the interest rate spread, exchange
rate stability, the level of corruption and outspoken government commitment (See 4.2).
The hypothesis that positive spill-over effects of the government bond market exist could
not be confirmed. Instead, government debt may crowd out private investors, as an
increase in the size of the government bond market decreased the size of the corporate
bond market by 0.1 % to 0.2 % (See 4.2.3). In line with our hypothesis, the global
financial crisis led to growth in the East Asian corporate bond market of 2 % to 2.4 %.
(See 4.2.4)
5.3. Integration
The prospects of integrating the bond markets in East Asia were found to be an in-
crease in liquidity due to increased market and a broader investor base, the possibility
to smooth consumption, share risks and enhanced macroeconomic discipline due to par-
ticipation of foreign investors. But international and regional integration might also be
a source of financial instability as the financial system may become more fragile, insti-
tutional weaknesses can cause capital miss allocation and sudden capital reversals could
exaggerate existing problems or crises. (See 2.2.3)
An overview of academic literature revealed that the state of integration in the East
Asian bond markets is weak at best. East Asia seems less integrated than other devel-
oping regions, like the CEE countries. The major obstacles that remain are different
regulatory frameworks, rating standards and in some cases the lack of transparent insti-
tutions. (See 3.3.1)
5.4. Regionalism
Despite two major regional initiatives being founded that target the development of
the East Asian bond markets, the results of this regional cooperation are scarce, and
progress nearly came to a halt before the global financial crisis. The actual development
of the region’s bond markets in this period was almost exclusively local and the regional
initiatives exerted only little influence. The crisis sparked renewed interest and led to the
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creation of the Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility (CGIF), the establishment of
the Asian Bond Market Forum (ABMF) and the final opening-up of the national Asian
Bond Funds.
The major achievements of the Asian Bond Market Initiative are the CGIF, a regional
forum and several guides on the East Asian bond markets. But the actual impact of them
on the market seem to be minimal. The Asian Bond Fund established a fund of East
Asian bonds that is open for investment to outside investors. With the establishment of
national sub-funds, countries opened up their bond markets to foreign investors. Even
though this process of opening-up nearly came to a halt, momentum was renewed in
the wake of the global financial crisis. By May 2011, all national bond funds were open
for investments of foreigners. Despite the various efforts of the regional initiatives, the
major obstacles of different regulations and rating standards remain. (See 3.3.3)
5.5. Concluding Remarks
The Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 was the decisive turning point in the development
of bond markets in the region. Countries experienced that they were too reliant on
the banking system and on the inflow of short-term foreign capital. The development
of the region’s local bond markets provided a way to overcome this source of financial
instability and to diversify the region’s financial system.
A lot has happened since then. In sheer size the East Asian bond markets exploded.
This development was especially led by the government bond markets. It has to be
stressed that a large part of the East Asian bond markets consists of central bank bills
that were used to sterilize liquidity that resulted from a continuous foreign exchange
reserve build-up. When this reserve accumulation becomes a burden to the economy the
rapid growth in the government bond markets may come to a halt and reverse1.
Rapid development occurred also in some corporate bond markets. Whereas the Chi-
nese corporate bond market was virtually non-existent in 2000, it now accounts for over
one fourth of the corporate bonds in the whole region. But bond market development
does not only involve quantitative growth. Instead, it is of major importance to provide
the institutions and infrastructure in order to facilitate growth. While the East Asian
1With the PBOC struggling to inject liquidity into the Chinese financial system it set out to not
renew outstanding bills in late 2012. From July 2010 to June 2012 central-bank-bills and -bonds
outstanding decreased by 63 %. This set liquidity free worth approximately CNY 2822 billion (USD
448 billion). As long as capital is flowing out of China this trend is continuing. This kind of reversal
could happen to every country in East Asia.
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bond markets grew in the last decade they developed qualitatively as well.
But neither quantitative nor qualitative development is completed or sufficient in all
markets. The major obstacles remains insufficient liquidity and the weak investor base
that holds securities until maturity. Liquidity could be greatly increased by further
integrating regional markets. However, integration and harmonization has so far been
left to the individual states and is still moving slowly.
While the Asian financial crisis was the event that kick-started the development in the
debt markets, the global financial rejuvenated the dynamics of development. But the
crisis was also the first major test: could the markets play the desired role of substituting
for bank-lending? The East Asian bond markets clearly passed this test. In this situation
qualitative development of the market allowed the corporate debt markets to play the
role of a spare tire and consequently led to quantitative growth. While this certainly is
a huge success, it remains to be seen whether the markets can play the same role when
a crisis originates from within the region itself. But it seems clear that it will be crucial
to further develop, integrate and harmonize the markets in the region.
105

A. Appendix
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Figure A.1.: Bond Market Development relative to Economic Development
Year-on-Year Growth of Major Korean Government Securities
(monthly year-on-year change in percent)
Source: ECOS
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Figure A.2.: Korean Government Bond Market YoY-Growth by Type
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Table A.1.: Original Sin in Asia
OSIN 1 OSIN 3
MEAN MED MEAN MED
1993 1 1 1 1
1994 1 1 0,99 1
1995 1 1 0,99 1
1996 1 1 0,97 1
1997 1 1 0,99 1
1998 1 1 0,98 1
1999 0,99 1 0,96 1
2000 0,99 1 0,95 1
2001 0,99 1 0,94 1
2002 0,99 1 0,96 1
2003 0,99 1 0,97 1
2004 0,99 1 0,97 1
2005 0,98 1 0,97 0,99
2006 0,98 1 0,96 0,99
2007 0,96 1 0,92 0,93
2008 0,95 1 0,91 0,95
Source: Hausmann and Panizza (2011)
Table A.2.: Original Sin in Asian Countries
OSIN 1 OSIN1 OSIN 3 OSIN 3
1993-1998 1999-2001 1993-1998 1999-2001
China 1 1 1 1
Indonesia 0,98 0,99 0,94 0,98
Japan 0,64 0,53 0 0
Korea 1 1 1 1
Malaysia 1 1 0,99 1
Philippines 0,99 1 0,98 0,99
Singapore 0,97 0,94 0,96 0,7
Taiwan 1 0,99 1 0,54
Thailand 1 0,99 1 0,54
Source: Eichengreen et al. (2005)
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Table A.3.: Foreign Exchange Reserves billion US $
World Rank Country Foreign Exchange Reserves (est)
1 CN 3,316.00
2 JP 1,063.00
5 TW 418.40
8 KR 320.10
9 HK 288.80
11 SG 248.70
13 TH 202.20
18 ID 136.20
20 MY 129.60
27 PH 72.30
63 VN 16.76
Data as of 31. Dec. 2011 (JP as of 2010)
Source: CIA (2012)
Table A.4.: Market Based Instruments as Share of Total Instruments
CN HK ID KR MY PH SG TH TW
2000 - 64 89 79 61 94 76 70
2001 - 67 88 84 48 94 92 79
2002 7 - 72 86 85 54 94 94 83
2003 8 - 68 88 88 63 95 95 87
2004 18 - 76 91 92 64 95 95 87
2005 31 - 65 89 92 71 95 96 88
2006 42 - 64 86 91 49 95 96 88
2007 39 - 62 84 91 55 95 97 86
2008 34 - 67 82 92 63 94 97 88
2009 31 - 59 87 99 68 93 98 88
2010 29 - 31 89 97 75 93 98 87
Highlighted cells indicate balance sheet losses of central banks.
Source: Lo¨ﬄer et al. (2012)
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Foreign Holdings in LCY Government Bonds
(percent of total)
Source: AsianBondsOnline
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Figure A.3.: Foreign Holdings in LCY Government Bonds
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Domestic Financing Prole
(percent of total, as of September 2011)
Source: AsianBondsOnline
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Figure A.4.: Domestic Financing Profile, for society as a whole
Corporate Bonds by International Rating
in Emerging Asia 2010
Source: Dealogic DCM Analytics as cited in Shim 2012
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Figure A.5.: Internationally Rated Corporate Bonds in Emerging Asia by Rating
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Table A.8.: Internationally / Locally Rated Bonds in Emerging Asia
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (Q1-Q3)
Internationally Rated 15,226 13,378 6,206 4,147 11,628 10,455 12,451
Locally Rated / Unrated 56,150 57,591 84,423 121,940 241,850 215,177 194,571
Source: Shim (2012)
Table A.9.: Pension Systems in East Asia (2011)
Public DBS Public DCS Private DCS
China x
Hong Kong x
Indonesia x
Japan x
Korea x
Malaysia x
Philippines x
Singapore x
Thailand x
Vietnam x
Source: OECD (2012)
Ratio of Total Pension Assets to GDP (2006)
Source: Park 2009
0
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VNTHSGPHMYKRIDCN
Figure A.6.: Ratio of Pension Assets to GDP
114
B. Appendix – Regressions
Table B.1.: Macroeconomic Determinants of the Government Bond Market
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES gov bond gdp gov bond gdp gov bond gdp gov bond gdp
gdp ppp 6.032*** 7.372*** 1.930*** -0.0111
(2.046) (1.224) (0.356) (0.686)
gdp capita ppp 2.269 3.615** 4.404*** 11.89***
(2.882) (1.774) (0.489) (0.640)
openness 0.0237 0.0295 -0.0131** -0.0669***
(0.0322) (0.0199) (0.00556) (0.00568)
i spread 0.329 1.498* -0.921*** 0.371***
(1.305) (0.792) (0.216) (0.143)
bank credit 0.0565 0.0360 0.124*** 0.196***
(0.0440) (0.0310) (0.00873) (0.0122)
xr stability -19.99*** -19.89*** -22.31*** -0.326
(6.048) (3.882) (0.698) (0.983)
japan 68.59*** 74.18*** 57.62*** 42.56***
(10.85) (11.10) (1.853) (3.059)
Constant -154.9*** -208.7*** -55.02*** -88.23***
(49.21) (27.34) (8.439) (18.56)
Observations 136 136 110 100
Panels (countries) 10 10 10
OLS GLS HET GLS CSD GLS CSD PSAR1
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(OLS) OLS-estimator, (GLS) GLS-estimator, (HET) heteroskedastic errors
(CSD) cross-sectional dependent errors, (PSAR1) panel-specific AR1 process
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Table B.2.: Institutional Determinants of the Government Bond Market
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES gov bond gdp gov bond gdp gov bond gdp gov bond gdp
corruption -30.40*** -25.20*** -18.62*** -7.594***
(8.002) (6.363) (1.620) (1.681)
law -12.22* -11.00* -20.06*** -3.441
(7.094) (6.071) (1.329) (2.478)
regulatory 39.37*** 32.30*** 37.39*** 2.361
(6.840) (5.810) (1.784) (2.395)
bank concentration 26.68** 17.80** 8.482*** 18.10***
(10.39) (8.420) (1.960) (2.614)
pension dc -4.188 -4.324 -8.055*** -8.790***
(3.860) (2.637) (1.810) (2.630)
gov commit 29.00*** 28.29*** 29.49*** 22.09***
(4.031) (3.298) (0.800) (1.277)
japan 132.9*** 128.1*** 130.8*** 35.47***
(7.129) (8.658) (1.950) (6.087)
Constant -3.444 4.288 12.18*** 12.95***
(8.308) (6.606) (2.202) (1.942)
Observations 100 100 90 80
Panels (countries) 10 10 10
OLS GLS HET GLS CSD GLS CSD PSAR1
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(OLS) OLS-estimator, (GLS) GLS-estimator, (HET) heteroskedastic errors
(CSD) cross-sectional dependent errors, (PSAR1) panel-specific AR1 process
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Table B.3.: Determinants of the Government Bond Market
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES gov bond gdp gov bond gdp gov bond gdp
gdp ppp 3.276 2.639** 1.995
(2.300) (1.267) (1.542)
gdp capita ppp 7.681 8.917*** 4.955
(6.090) (3.165) (4.243)
openness 0.0944*** 0.0796*** 0.0514**
(0.0358) (0.0207) (0.0215)
i spread 3.353** 3.488*** 2.857***
(1.368) (0.713) (0.679)
bank credit 0.174*** 0.199*** 0.168***
(0.0486) (0.0283) (0.0336)
xr stability -8.137 -11.61*** -7.832**
(5.291) (2.969) (3.492)
corruption -31.92*** -26.05*** -12.92***
(7.683) (4.009) (3.721)
law -27.73*** -24.65*** -26.65***
(7.244) (4.077) (4.761)
regulatory 34.72*** 25.52*** 22.96***
(7.568) (4.423) (5.277)
bank concentration 27.29*** 22.62*** 7.317
(10.00) (6.281) (5.901)
pension dc -13.25*** -10.91*** -13.01***
(4.078) (2.153) (2.304)
gov commit 39.82*** 36.87*** 37.11***
(4.879) (2.955) (2.993)
japan 117.1*** 104.8*** 108.0***
(12.37) (9.939) (15.28)
Constant -194.8*** -183.1*** -110.0***
(45.20) (22.82) (34.45)
Observations 100 100 80
Panels (countries) 10 10
OLS GLS HET GLS HET PSAR1
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(OLS) OLS-estimator, (GLS) GLS-estimator, (HET) heteroskedastic errors
(CSD) cross-sectional dependent errors, (PSAR1) panel-specific AR1 process
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Table B.4.: Macroeconomic Determinats of the Corporate Bond Market
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES corp bond gdp corp bond gdp corp bond gdp corp bond gdp
gdp ppp -2.673** -1.812*** -4.569*** -2.742***
(1.161) (0.645) (0.329) (0.0607)
gdp capita ppp 20.36*** 14.67*** 21.79*** 12.44***
(1.565) (1.243) (0.384) (0.212)
openness -0.0898*** -0.0382*** -0.0890*** -0.0304***
(0.0171) (0.0136) (0.00515) (0.00131)
i spread -1.206** -0.734** -2.629*** 0.00425
(0.562) (0.338) (0.106) (0.0192)
bank credit -0.105*** -0.0530*** -0.122*** 0.0307***
(0.0169) (0.0132) (0.00196) (0.00112)
xr stability 13.86*** 6.976*** 16.90*** 1.840***
(3.245) (2.114) (0.838) (0.118)
Constant -73.86** -59.40*** -29.05*** -23.99***
(28.27) (14.10) (8.062) (1.892)
Observations 133 133 110 110
Panels (countries) 10 10 10
OLS GLS HET GLS CSD GLS CSD PSAR1
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(OLS) OLS-estimator, (GLS) GLS-estimator, (HET) heteroskedastic errors
(CSD) cross-sectional dependent errors, (PSAR1) panel-specific AR1 process
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Table B.5.: Institutional Determinants of the Corporate Bond Market
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES corp bond gdp corp bond gdp corp bond gdp corp bond gdp
corruption -20.43*** -10.16*** -15.90*** -0.466
(4.417) (3.036) (1.809) (0.661)
law 24.83*** 17.88*** 19.60*** 7.954***
(4.261) (3.069) (1.105) (0.433)
regulatory 10.31*** 3.951* 11.23*** 4.844***
(3.651) (2.314) (1.521) (0.537)
bank concentration -2.529 -2.229 -5.948*** 1.702*
(5.649) (3.423) (1.138) (0.978)
pension dc 4.025* 3.590** 2.774** 2.871
(2.220) (1.429) (1.341) (2.871)
gov commit 14.68*** 17.29*** 14.80*** 19.78***
(2.169) (1.780) (0.983) (3.336)
Constant 5.195 6.406*** 8.554*** 6.115***
(4.148) (2.451) (1.165) (0.714)
Observations 99 99 90 80
Panels (countries) 10 10 10
OLS GLS HET GLS CSD GLS CSD PSAR1
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(OLS) OLS-estimator, (GLS) GLS-estimator, (HET) heteroskedastic errors
(CSD) cross-sectional dependent errors, (PSAR1) panel-specific AR1 process
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Table B.6.: Determinants of the Corporate Bond Market
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES corp bond gdp corp bond gdp corp bond gdp corp bond gdp
gdp ppp -2.472** -2.323** -2.206*** -2.237***
(1.190) (1.003) (0.545) (0.358)
gdp capita ppp 21.67*** 17.11*** 16.46*** 12.49***
(3.302) (2.904) (1.272) (1.068)
openness -0.0449*** -0.0296** -0.0443*** 0.00135
(0.0164) (0.0149) (0.00986) (0.00652)
i spread -0.550 -0.324 -0.558* -0.362***
(0.449) (0.309) (0.300) (0.0926)
bank credit -0.0684*** -0.0305 -0.0551*** 0.0158*
(0.0215) (0.0191) (0.0136) (0.00940)
xr stability 15.47*** 11.62*** 10.51*** 2.935***
(2.703) (2.441) (2.156) (0.701)
corruption -17.59*** -14.19*** -10.21*** -2.457**
(3.643) (3.068) (2.364) (1.051)
law 16.27*** 11.97*** 7.513*** 0.0820
(4.019) (3.674) (2.405) (0.999)
regulatory -3.641 -1.832 2.544 -2.440**
(3.738) (2.989) (2.467) (1.225)
bank concentration 0.631 0.790 -6.177*** 1.401
(5.876) (4.550) (2.050) (1.186)
pension dc 4.060** 3.641** 4.219*** 1.570
(2.014) (1.541) (1.185) (1.344)
gov commit 6.353** 10.62*** 8.008*** 16.26***
(2.437) (2.055) (1.865) (1.312)
Constant -108.0*** -77.81*** -64.41*** -42.59***
(24.79) (21.77) (11.50) (10.02)
Observations 99 99 90 80
Panels (countries) 10 10 10
OLS GLS HET GLS CSD GLS CSD PSAR1
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(OLS) OLS-estimator, (GLS) GLS-estimator, (HET) heteroskedastic errors
(CSD) cross-sectional dependent errors, (PSAR1) panel-specific AR1 process
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Table B.7.: Testing Hypothesis 3: GFC as a determinant of the Corporate Bond Market?
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES corp bond gdp corp bond gdp corp bond gdp
gdp ppp -2.844*** -9.367***
(0.0481) (3.123)
gdp capita ppp 13.52*** 21.53***
(0.188) (2.986)
openness -0.0349*** 0.0136*
(0.000904) (0.00709)
i spread -0.00842 -0.327
(0.0119) (0.251)
bank credit 0.0311*** -0.000186
(0.000711) (0.0131)
xr stability 1.797*** -0.241
(0.0781) (1.078)
gfc -0.112*** 1.122** -0.267
(0.0313) (0.439) (0.588)
corruption 3.469*** 0.557
(1.215) (1.002)
law 6.683*** -0.961
(0.672) (0.943)
regulatory 1.539 -3.844***
(1.378) (1.094)
bank concentration 2.604* 9.979***
(1.329) (2.146)
pension dc 3.949*** -12.33*
(1.502) (7.090)
gov commit 19.33*** 23.09***
(1.526) (4.179)
Constant -29.58*** 5.878*** 67.52
(1.715) (1.231) (58.67)
Observations 110 80 80
Panels (countries) 10 10 10
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1), (2) & (3) GLS-estimator with panel-specific AR1 and cross-sectional dependent errors
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C. Appendix – Data
Table C.1.: Used Data Sources
Indicator Source Description and Comments
Reserve Money IFS (2012) national currency unit; IDN from 2001,
JP, MY, PH and TH from 2009 monetary
base used instead of reserve money
Foreign Assets IFS (2012) national currency unit
Sterilization IFS (2012) Sterilization = (Reserve Money - Foreign
Assets)/Reserve Money
GFC Dummy 1 since 2008
GDP (PPP) World Bank (2012b) current international $,
[NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD]
GDP per capita (PPP) World Bank (2012b) current international $,
[NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD]
Interest Rate Spread World Bank (2012b) lending rate minus deposit rate,
[FR.INR.LNDP]
Bank Credit World Bank (2012b) Domestic credit provided by banking sec-
tor (% of GDP), [FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS]
Openness World Bank (2012b) Imports+Exports as Share of GDP,
[NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS + NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS]
Corruption Kaufmann et al. (2010) Estimate of governance
Law Kaufmann et al. (2010) Estimate of rule of law
Regulatory Kaufmann et al. (2010) Estimate of regulatory framework
Exchange Rate Stability Aizenman et al. (2008) Exchange Rate Stability
Bank Concentration Beck et al. (2010) Assets of three largest banks as a share of
assets of all commercial banks.
Government Bond per GDP AsianBondsOnline (2012a) % of GDP, EOY
Corporate Bond per GDP AsianBondsOnline (2012a) % of GDP, EOY
Pension DC OECD (2012) 1 for defined contribution scheme
Government Commitment dummy, 1 for KR, MY and SGP
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List of Abbreviations
ABF Asian Bond Fund
ABMI Asian Bond Market Initiative
ADB Asian Development Bank
AFC Asian Financial Crisis
BIS Bank for International Settlements
CGIF Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility
CJK China, Japan, Korea
DBS Defined Benefit Scheme
DCS Defined Contribution Scheme
EMEAP Executives’ Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks and Mon-
etary Authorities
Fed Federal Reserve Bank
GFC Global Financial Crisis
GLS Generalized Least Squares
IPO Initial Public Offering
LCY Local Currency Unit
MTN Medium Term Note
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
PAIF Pan Asian Index Fund
PBC People’s Bank of China
T-bill Treasury Bill
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Abstract
Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the East Asian region started to focus on the de-
velopment of its bond markets. This thesis tracks the potential benefits of bond market
development and integration and analyzes the current state of development, integration
and regionalism in the East Asian bond markets. Subsequently, a multivariate model
is used to determine which endogenous economic factors drove development in the East
Asian government- and corporate bond markets. It is found that, despite rapid devel-
opment, the markets are still very heterogeneous in terms of size and liquidity. Aside
from several macroeconomic and institutional factors, growth in the government bond
market was driven by monetary authorities’ sterilization efforts; corporate bond markets
grew particularly during the global financial crisis; and government debt may crowd out
corporate debt in the region.
Zusammenfassung
Seit der Asienkrise 1997 arbeiten die Staaten Ostasiens an der gezielten Entwicklung
ihrer Anleihema¨rkte. Diese Arbeit untersucht den aktuellen Stand der Entwicklung, der
Integration und des Regionalismus in den ostasiatischen Unternehmens- und Staatsanlei-
hema¨rkten. Weiters werden mittels eines multivariaten Modells die wichtigsten Faktoren
bestimmt, die die Entwicklung der ostasiatischen Anleihenma¨rkte beeinflussten. Trotz
des rapiden Wachstums seit der Asienkrise blieben die Ma¨rkte sehr unterschiedlich en-
twickelt und kaum integriert. Die multivariate Analyse findet zahlreiche makroo¨konomis-
che und institutionelle Faktoren, die sich auf die Entwicklung der Ma¨rkte auswirken.
Weiters zeigt die empirische Untersuchung, dass (1) das Wachstum in den Staatsan-
leihema¨rkten insbesondere auf die Sterilisationsmanahmen der Zentralbanken zuru¨ck-
zufu¨hren ist, (2) das Volumen der Unternehmensanleihen besonders im Verlauf der glob-
alen Finanzkrise stieg und (3) dass es crowding-out-Effekte der Staatsanleihen auf die
Unternehmensanleihen in Ostasien gab.
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